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PRIVACY LOCALISM
Ira S. Rubinstein*
Abstract: Privacy law scholarship often focuses on domain-specific federal privacy laws
and state efforts to broaden them. This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of
privacy regulation at the local level (which it dubs “privacy localism”), using recently enacted
privacy laws in Seattle and New York City as principal examples. Further, this Article
attributes the rise of privacy localism to a combination of federal and state legislative failures
and three emerging urban trends: the role of local police in federal counterterrorism efforts;
smart city and open data initiatives; and demands for local police reform in the wake of widely
reported abusive police practices.
Both Seattle and New York City have enacted or proposed (1) a local surveillance
ordinance regulating the purchase and use of surveillance equipment and technology by city
departments, including the police, and (2) a law regulating city departments’ collection, use,
disclosure, and retention of personal data. In adopting these local laws, both cities have sought
to fill two significant gaps in federal and state privacy laws: the public surveillance gap, which
refers to the weak constitutional and statutory protections against government surveillance in
public places, and the fair information practices gap, which refers to the inapplicability of the
federal and state privacy laws to government records held by local government agencies.
Filling these gaps is a significant accomplishment and one that exhibits all of the values
typically associated with federalism such as diversity, participation, experimentation,
responsiveness, and accountability. This Article distinguishes federalism and localism and
shows why privacy localism should prevail against the threat of federal and—more
importantly—state preemption. This Article concludes by suggesting that privacy localism has
the potential to help shape emerging privacy norms for an increasingly urban future, inspire
more robust regulation at the federal and state levels, and inject more democratic control into
city deployments of privacy-invasive technologies.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the U.S. Congress has largely abdicated its role
in regulating online consumer privacy or modernizing electronic
surveillance laws to strengthen privacy protections in the context of
emerging technologies. Congress enacted many important privacy laws
from the 1970s through the 1990s, and updated several of them in the
2000s, but since then its privacy accomplishments have dwindled.1 Both
Democrats and Republicans have introduced comprehensive online
consumer privacy bills but have not passed any of them. 2 Despite five
years of debate, Congress has also failed to update the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the thirty-two-year-old law
governing electronic surveillance.3 Congress has fared somewhat better in
reforming foreign intelligence surveillance following the revelations of
former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden.
For example, it ended bulk collection of telephone metadata under the
NSA foreign surveillance law.4 But the era of reform did not last. During
the first year of the Trump presidency, the Republican Congress voted to
rescind Obama-era broadband privacy rules,5 and at the beginning of its
second year rejected a bipartisan push to add new privacy protections to a
provision of the foreign surveillance law that was about to expire.6
During this period, state legislatures have been very active and
successful in addressing consumer security and privacy. As of 2017,
almost all fifty states have enacted breach notification statutes requiring
1. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 36–39 (6th ed.
2018) [hereinafter SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW].
2. See discussion infra section I.A.1.
3. The most recent attempt at modernization, brought forward in July 2017 by Senators Mike Lee
and Patrick Leahy, has languished in the Senate Judiciary Committee since its introduction despite
unanimous passage of related legislation by the House. See ECPA Modernization Act of 2017, S.
1657, 115th Cong. (2017); Allison Grande, Sens. Push ECPA Reform Bill to Up Email, Location
Privacy, LAW360 (July 27, 2017, 9:38 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/948832/sens-pushecpa-reform-bill-to-up-email-location-privacy (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
4. Sabrina Siddiqui, Congress Passes NSA Surveillance Reform in Vindication for Snowden,
GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015, 2:28 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/02/congresssurveillance-reform-edward-snowden [https://perma.cc/L4Q2-EDA5].
5. S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); see Kimberly Kindy, How Congress Dismantled
Federal
Internet
Privacy
Rules,
WASH.
POST
(May
30,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-congress-dismantled-federal-internet-privacyrules/2017/05/29/7ad06e14-2f5b-11e7-8674-437ddb6e813e_story.html?utm_term=.72a16f43a646
[https://perma.cc/SGU8-E3T8].
6. See Louise Matsakis, Congress Renews Warrantless Surveillance—and Makes It Even Worse,
WIRED (Jan. 11, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/fisa-section-702-renewal-congress/
[https://perma.cc/2Q4L-VVKL].
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firms to disclose security breaches involving personal information and a
few have set substantive requirements for data security. 7 But states have
done more than fill the gaps in federal privacy laws.8 They have expanded
online privacy protections,9 regulated private- and public-sector use of
emerging technologies,10 and enacted social media privacy laws.11
Now there is a new kid on the block: local privacy law and regulation.
Local governments (primarily cities but also counties) have joined federal
and state governments in enacting important new privacy laws.12 This
development has yet to receive attention even in the newest editions of
privacy law casebooks and treatises. And the reason is obvious: until
recently, cities played only a minor role in information privacy law. But
this is beginning to change for several reasons.
American cities, especially large urban centers, are data-rich
environments. Cities have large populations and city dwellers generate a
vast amount of data through daily interaction with devices and sensors as
they crisscross public spaces and utilize city services. A growing number
of local police departments rely on special purpose technologies such as
video security cameras, facial recognition technology, automatic license
plate readers (ALPRs), police dashboard and body-worn cameras, and
gunfire location services to assist them in maintaining public order,
enforcing criminal laws, and safeguarding citizens against terrorist
attacks. In New York City, for example, these surveillance efforts take
place on a very broad scale that, when combined with analytic tools for

7. See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breachnotification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/LJ9X-LLVQ].
8. Id. at 948 (noting that the federal government has yet to enact a general federal data breach
notification statute or to establish broad standards requiring private firms outside the financial services
or health care sectors to reasonably protect consumer data).
9. See, e.g., Gregory S. McNeal, California AG Releases Guide to Online Privacy Laws, FORBES
(May 21, 2014, 7:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/05/21/california-agreleases-guide-to-californias-online-privacy-laws/#2b5ac0b3798c [https://perma.cc/DW4D-YYNP]
(describing amendments to California’s “landmark” Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003).
10. See infra section III.D.1.
11. Beginning in 2012, many states have limited what entities may do with or require of
individuals’ personal social media accounts. Twenty-six have done so for employers; sixteen for
educational institutions; and one for landlords. See State Social Media Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/state-laws-prohibiting-access-to-social-media-usernames-andpasswords.aspx [https://perma.cc/5F4P-4MG5].
12. See infra sections II.A, II.B.
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discovering unanticipated patterns,13 provide the basis for what Professor
Andrew Ferguson and others refer to as “big data policing.”14
Cities also offer a diverse range of municipal services that touch almost
every aspect of each resident’s life. City agencies use a variety of means,
including city web sites and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, to collect
data related to infrastructure, traffic, utilities, tourism, education, child
welfare, housing, and healthcare. So-called “smart cities” analyze these
massive datasets to enable more efficient and effective monitoring and
coordination of maintenance, mobility, environmental management,
visitor movements, social services, and neighborhood sentiment.15 They
are also starting to deploy mobile apps to make such services more readily
accessible to city residents.16 And many cities now make these datasets
freely available to the wider public through open data programs that
publish all sorts of government data that anyone can use, analyze, or
redistribute as they wish for a range of beneficial purposes.17
The arrival of big data in the urban environment brings with it an array
of privacy challenges centered on two very different types of data: police
data and civic data.18 Police data encompasses criminal and arrest records
collected by local police departments, other crime data, and related
metadata captured by surveillance technologies.19 Civic data includes both
registration data (i.e., birth, death, marriage, and voting records

13. See Thomas H. Davenport, How Big Data Is Helping the NYPD Solve Crimes Faster, FORTUNE
(July
17,
2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/07/17/big-data-nypd-situational-awareness/
[https://perma.cc/8CQD-QF4A].
14. See generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING:
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing
by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014).
15. On the value and uses of civic data, see generally STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & SUSAN CRAWFORD,
THE RESPONSIVE CITY: ENGAGING COMMUNITIES THROUGH DATA-SMART GOVERNANCE (2014).
16. See Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy in a
Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1584 (2015).
17. See generally Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Open Data, Privacy, and Fair
Information Principles: Towards a Balancing Framework, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2073 (2015).
18. See Liesbet van Zoonen, Privacy Concerns in Smart Cities, 33 GOV’T INFO. Q. 472, 474–75
(2016). Zoonen analyzes city privacy concerns by identifying a two-by-two scheme in which there
are two types of data (personal or impersonal) and two purposes for collection and use (service or
surveillance). Applying this scheme, she argues that police data (personal data combined with
surveillance purposes) raises greater privacy concerns than civic data (personal data combined with
service purposes).
19. Police data may also include (1) external data collected by other government agencies and
(2) privately collected data that a local police department purchases from external sources such as
commercial data brokers or police analytic platforms. See Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The
Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977, 994 (2017). Police department acquisition of data from other
government agencies or from external sources is beyond the scope of this paper.
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maintained at the local level) and the vast range of data generated and
used by municipal services.
Cities large, medium, and small have responded to the privacy issues
associated with urban big data by enacting local surveillance ordinances
governing police data and adopting broad privacy principles addressing
civic data. More than fifteen cities now have surveillance ordinances
requiring local police forces to prepare and publish protocols disclosing
the intended use and deployment of surveillance equipment and
technologies, including information on data collection, use, access,
retention, and sharing with other governmental entities.20 These and other
cities have also developed privacy guidelines governing smart city/IoT
data practices, with Seattle and New York City emerging as leaders in
these efforts. Both cities have enacted local laws covering all municipal
data collection and use and have appointed Chief Privacy Officers.21
While this legislative activity is partly a response to regulatory gaps left
by federal and state privacy laws, privacy localism also results from
several broader and overlapping societal trends. These include the war on
terror, which heightened the role of local police in federal counterterrorism activities; “smart city” initiatives, which rely on potentially
invasive technologies to help cities achieve important municipal goals
such as improving their delivery of services; and the intense public
scrutiny of abusive policing practices, including the use of certain
surveillance technologies.22
This Article provides the first comprehensive analysis of privacy
localism by examining its origins, motivations, and outcomes in response
to these trends.23 Using detailed case studies of Seattle and New York
City, it considers how these two very different cities have regulated the
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information by both police and
civilian agencies. This requires exploring a variety of policy issues
including how police balance security against privacy safeguards as they
20. See Community Control over Police Surveillance, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-over-police-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/XE7G-TU2J] (identifying cities that have enacted or are considering local laws
regulating police acquisition and use of surveillance technologies). Some of these laws also require
city council approval prior to acquisition and use. See infra sections II.A.1, II.B.1.
21. See infra sections II.A.2, II.B.2.
22. See infra section I.A.2.
23. For two complementary studies of local privacy regulation that also rely on case studies of
major cities, see generally Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH.
L. REV. 1595 (2016) (discussing Seattle, Oakland, San Diego), and Jan Whittington et al., Push, Pull,
and Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study in Municipal Open Government, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1899 (2015) (discussing Seattle).
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adopt networked surveillance technology and how civilian agencies
balance data exchanges and data analysis to achieve public goods against
the need to maintain the confidentiality of the underlying data and the trust
of local citizens.
What, then, is privacy localism? In normative terms, localism refers to
a preference for local control of government function, while the law of
localism describes the relations between states and their local
governments.24 This Article mainly addresses cities, but the term “local”
covers every political subdivision smaller than a state. Thus, “privacy
localism” refers to local control over the collection, use, and disclosure of
the personal data of city residents. It encompasses the ordinances, local
laws, executive orders, resolutions, regulations, policies, and practices of
local governments insofar as they control (1) the surveillance activities of
city police departments and other city agencies, and (2) the data collection
and use practices of city agencies in the course of providing municipal
services. The term also emphasizes a set of values including
decentralization and local autonomy, which are traditionally associated
with both federalism and localism.25
Of course, skeptics will ask whether privacy localism is viable. They
will quite properly express doubts as to whether cities—occupying the
lowest slot in the federal-state-city hierarchy—have enough power to
engage in privacy localism without falling prey to federal, and especially
state, interventions. Obviously, local privacy regulations are always at risk
of federal and state preemption. Furthermore, federal and state agencies
have far more resources at their disposal compared to cities, most of which
probably lack the regulatory expertise and personnel needed to enter the
already crowded field of privacy regulation or make any significant
contributions.26 Thus, there are structural as well as practical constraints
on privacy localism.
And yet, cities can contribute a great deal to privacy law. This Article
argues that cities have ample power to regulate both local police
surveillance activities and local data governance practices, and that
preemption is much less of an obstacle to privacy localism than one might
suspect.27 It offers three arguments in favor of privacy localism. The first
is that privacy issues are highly salient to cities for the reasons already
24. See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 381 (2001).
25. See infra section III.A.
26. See Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulatory Review for the States, NAT’L AFF.,
Summer 2014, at 37, 48.
27. Note, too, that even when federal or state law threatens to preempt local privacy regulation, it
mainly establishes privacy “floors” that cities can and do exceed. See infra section III.B.
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identified: that is where the people are, and hence where their data is, in
great abundance. The second is that both Fourth Amendment doctrine and
federal and state electronic surveillance laws are mostly silent on
government surveillance in public places (the public surveillance gap),28
and generally fail to address the data practices of government agencies
(the fair information practices gap).29 Privacy localism fills both of these
gaps. The third is that cities are ideally suited to regulate police use of
surveillance technology and local data practices because of their
willingness to innovate, experiment, and devise novel approaches to
privacy protection.
To set the stage for this discussion, Part I briefly considers the perilous
state of privacy in the twenty-first century and how cities have responded
to federal and state legislative failures and the broader societal trends
identified above. It also analyzes in detail the public surveillance gap and
the fair information practices gap. Part II then presents detailed case
studies of local privacy regulation in Seattle and New York City,
examining both local surveillance laws and local privacy principles
governing city agencies. It concludes with a preliminary assessment of
these regulations in terms of their overall contribution to democratic
governance of local police forces and how well they close the two privacy
gaps. Part III begins by attempting to sort out the relationship between
federalism and localism. Next, it responds to the highly realistic threat that
federal and (more importantly) state laws may limit or preempt a city’s
power to regulate local police surveillance and municipal data service,
explaining why this threat is manageable. The Article then concludes with
a forward-looking inquiry into the future of privacy localism on a national
basis.
I.

WHY PRIVACY LOCALISM?

A.

Privacy at Risk

1.

The Death of Privacy?

In an aptly named article in a 2000 Stanford Law Review symposium
on “Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?,” Professor
A. Michael Froomkin analyzed the public and private sector’s routine
collection of personal data and the growing use of privacy-destroying

28. See infra section II.C.2.
29. See infra section II.C.3.
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technologies.30 While denying that current privacy law in the United
States has kept up with the rapid advance of these technologies and
practices, Froomkin rejected the idea that privacy was dead.31 Rather, he
pinned his hopes on fair information practices and surveillance laws
restricting data collection, use, and retention.32
Almost twenty years later, is it still premature to mourn the death of
privacy? Froomkin warned of the dangers of pervasive information
collection online and in physical space before the 9/11 terrorist attacks
and Congress’s expansion of federal surveillance laws and practices;
before the rise of pervasive and invasive surveillance technologies—such
as networked video surveillance systems, facial recognition software,
cheap Global Position System (GPS) tracking devices, the massive data
collection resulting from ubiquitous IoT devices and new modes of
profiling, and location tracking via social media platforms and third-party
apps; and before big data began to systematically undermine the main
premises of privacy law.33 If privacy is not yet dead, it is no doubt
stunned.34 In any case, Froomkin has since ceased to believe that a legal
response will emerge anytime soon or that the future bodes well for
privacy.35 And his pessimism certainly seems justified based on
Congress’s poor record of enacting federal privacy laws that keep pace
with a new generation of invasive technologies and the advent of big data.
Despite its poor record, Congress has not been passive. Rather, it has
introduced laws and held hearings on numerous subjects—spyware,
cybersecurity, online behavioral tracking, cell phone tracking, mobile
apps, biometrics, and access to social media passwords—none of which
have advanced very far. Between 1970 and the mid-2000s, Congress
passed over two dozen mostly sector-specific federal privacy laws.36
Congress has also taken up omnibus privacy legislation seven times
between 1999 and 2011, but few bills were even reported out of
committee.37 In 2016, the Obama Administration tried to jumpstart the
30.
31.
32.
33.

A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1468–1500 (2000).
Id. at 1542.
Id.
See generally Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, INT’L
DATA PRIVACY L., May 2013, at 74, 76–78.
34. See
Monty
Python,
The
Dead
Parrot
Sketch,
DAVID
P.
BROWN
https://www.davidpbrown.co.uk/jokes/monty-python-parrot.html [https://perma.cc/FQ6R-DU8M].
35. See A. Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of Surveillance, 59
ARIZ. L. REV. 95 (2017).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 1–6.
37. See, e.g., Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011); Best
Practices Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2010); Online Personal Privacy Act, S. 2201, 107th Cong.
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legislative process by issuing a draft discussion bill, but it failed to find
any sponsors in Congress.38
There are ample grounds to predict that the 115th Congress will not
surpass its predecessors. To begin with, there is much controversy
concerning the accomplishments of the Republican Congress under
President Donald Trump.39 On the privacy front, the verdict is clear: the
new Congress has not passed a single privacy bill of note. Instead, it
withdrew the Obama Administration’s broadband privacy rules, leaving
the path open for state legislatures and city governments to take up the
slack.40 It has yet to agree on a data security breach notification bill, even
though the existing patchwork of state breach notification laws—all fifty
states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands have enacted such laws—cries out for federal consolidation.41 It
reauthorized a foreign surveillance provision allowing warrantless
surveillance in certain cases without adding new privacy protections.42
But even a unanimously passed reform bill in the House and a new
bipartisan bill in the Senate was not enough to make 2017 the year that
Congress achieved ECPA reform.43
There are some indications that Congress is stepping up its efforts to
enact consumer privacy legislation.44 In the meantime, the states continue
(2002); Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 4678, 107th Cong. (2002); Consumer Online
Privacy and Disclosure Act, H.R. 347, 107th Cong. (2001); Electronic Privacy Bill of Rights Act of
1999, H.R. 3321, 106th Cong. (1999); Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999, S. 809, 106th Cong.
(1999). S. 2201 was reported out of committee but did not advance.
38. See Natasha Singer, Why a Push for Online Privacy Is Bogged Down in Washington, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/29/technology/obamas-effort-onconsumer-privacy-falls-short-critics-say.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
39. Kelsey Snell, What Congress Accomplished and Didn’t Accomplish in 2017, NPR: ALL THINGS
CONSIDERED (Dec. 29, 2017, 4:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/29/574693600/what-congressaccomplished-and-didnt-accomplish-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/QBS4-7CE3].
40. See Eyragon Eidam & Jessica Mulholland, 10 States Take Internet Privacy Matters into Their
Own Hands, GOV’T TECH. (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.govtech.com/policy/10-States-Take-InternetPrivacy-Matters-Into-Their-Own-Hands.html [https://perma.cc/DKS6-EX8M]; Kindy, supra note 5.
41. See NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 7.
42. Matsakis, supra note 6; see also Robyn Greene, Americans Wanted More Privacy Protections.
Congress
Gave
Them
Fewer,
SLATE
(Jan.
26,
2018,
7:45
AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/01/congress-reauthorization-of-section-702-of-the-fisa-is-anexpansion-not-a-reform.html [https://perma.cc/BNT2-Y3NL].
43. See Grande, supra note 3. This is not the first time ECPA reform has stalled in the Senate after
easy passage through the House. See Sean D. Carberry, House Passes Email Privacy Act, Again, FCW
(Feb.
7,
2017),
https://fcw.com/articles/2017/02/07/ecpa-passes-house-again.aspx
[https://perma.cc/TEC2-VMJF].
44. See Daniel R. Stoller, Bipartisan Senate Quartet in Talks on Data Privacy Bill, BLOOMBERG
L.: PRIVACY & DATA SEC. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.bna.com/bipartisan-senate-quartetn73014482126/ [https://perma.cc/HLJ2-8RZM].
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to play the role of “especially important laboratories for innovations in
information privacy law.”45 States have always filled gaps in federal
privacy law and developed new laws addressing emerging technologies
and social practices.46 In May 2018, the California Legislature passed a
bold and sweeping consumer privacy law that may have ripple effects
throughout the United States.47 But for reasons discussed below, the states
have neither tackled surveillance laws addressing a new class of pervasive
and invasive technologies on a comprehensive basis nor enacted (or
extended) state privacy laws to protect records held by local governments.
Hence the need for privacy localism.
2.

Local Trends

One of the societal trends prompting local privacy regulations is the
war on terror, which has forced federal intelligence agencies to enlist state
and especially local police departments to serve as their “eyes and ears.”48
With control over billions of dollars in federal funding and generally
superior knowledge of foreign threats, the intelligence community seeks
to preserve centralized control over local counter-terrorism efforts, even
though much of the surveillance conducted within city limits is
undertaken by local police.49 Federal counter-terrorism officials interact
with local law enforcement in two main ways. First, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide
grant-in-aid programs to fund the acquisition of equipment used in

45. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 916 (2009) (arguing that
preemptive, omnibus federal privacy law would undermine experimentation in federal and state
sectoral privacy laws). Compare id., with Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy
Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868 (2009) (arguing that state experimentation tends to follow federal leadership).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 7–11.
47. See Eric Goldman, A Privacy Bomb Is About to Be Dropped on the California Economy and
the
Global
Internet,
TECH.
&
MKTG.
L.
BLOG
(June
27,
2018),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/06/a-privacy-bomb-is-about-to-be-dropped-on-thecalifornia-economy-and-the-global-internet.htm [https://perma.cc/GWQ2-V34M]. The new
California law may even prompt Congress to enact long awaited privacy legislation, which industry
hopes would include language preempting the new California law. See Jedidiah Bracy, Notes from
the IAPP Publications Editor, July 27, 2018, IAPP: U.S. PRIVACY DIG. (July 27, 2018),
https://iapp.org/news/a/notes-from-the-iapp-publications-editor-july-27-2018/
[https://perma.cc/FV4Y-WQXG].
48. Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1721
(2010). See generally Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64
STAN. L. REV. 289 (2012).
49. See Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, supra note 48, at 302–05;
Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and CounterTerrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POLICY 377, 388 (2009).
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counterterrorism and law enforcement activity, subject to various federal
conditions and requirements.50 Second, many cities participate in Joint
Terrorism Task Forces designed to coordinate counter-terrorism activity
across multiple levels of government51; they also help staff “fusion
centers” designed to generate and share local intelligence using
sophisticated monitoring and information gathering techniques.52
Not surprisingly, New York City took the lead in deploying a broad
range of surveillance technologies and otherwise securing the city in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks. For example, in 2008, the New York Police
Department (NYPD) launched a networked surveillance system in Lower
Manhattan “to bring extra protection to the Financial District, one of the
most tempting terror targets on earth.”53 It then worked with Microsoft to
co-design a citywide network of sensors, databases, devices, software, and
related infrastructure known as the “Domain Awareness System”
(DAS).54 Initially, the DAS included video security cameras, automatic
license plate readers (ALPRs), and radiation sensors.55 Later on, the
NYPD added geocoded criminal records and integrated the network
surveillance capabilities of the DAS with analytic methods designed to
inform both tactical decisions (like sending automatic alerts when
gunshots were detected) and strategic decisions (like using predictive
policing algorithms to help allocate police resources).56 Recognizing the

50. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, supra note 48, at 308. Of course,
in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. government also invested heavily in new surveillance technology
for its own use; set up bulk surveillance programs to gain systematic access to huge volumes of
telephone and internet metadata, foreign communication, and travel and financial data; and engaged
in aggressive data mining and analysis projects like the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program.
See generally Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Systematic Access to Private-Sector Data: A Comparative
Analysis, in BULK COLLECTION: SYSTEMATIC GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PRIVATE-SECTOR DATA 5–
48 (Fred H. Cate & James. X. Dempsey eds., 2017) (describing a range of NSA surveillance
programs); Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and
Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261 (2008) (discussing the TIA program).
51. See generally Susan N. Herman, Collapsing Spheres: Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Federalism,
and the War on Terror, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 941 (2005).
52. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2010).
53. RAY KELLY, VIGILANCE: MY LIFE SERVING AMERICA AND PROTECTING ITS EMPIRE CITY 204
(2015).
54. See Neal Ungerleider, NYPD, Microsoft Launch All-Seeing “Domain Awareness System” with
Real-Time
CCTV,
License
Plate
Monitoring,
FAST
C O.
(Aug.
8,
2012),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3000272/nypd-microsoft-launch-all-seeing-domain-awarenesssystem-real-time-cctv-license-plate-monito [https://perma.cc/73G3-7267].
55. See E. S. Levine et al., The New York City Police Department’s Domain Awareness System,
INTERFACES, Jan.-Feb. 2017, at 70, 75–76.
56. Id. at 73.
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utility of the DAS for general policing, the NYPD eventually deployed
the DAS to every precinct in the city and later developed a mobile version
optimized for smartphones and tablets for use by all of its police officers.57
More recent reports indicate that the NYPD has adopted sophisticated
facial recognition technology to search images from social media and
surveillance cameras for potential offenders.58 This amounts to police
surveillance of public spaces at an unprecedented scale that, when
combined with large-scale analytics, results in big data policing.59 To its
credit, the NYPD understood from the outset that the sheer size and scope
of the DAS would raise serious privacy concerns and, in the absence of
federal surveillance laws addressing the DAS, adopted privacy guidelines
covering its use of this new surveillance system; in 2017, the city council
introduced a local surveillance law as well.60
Another trend is the rash of smart city initiatives and their tendency to
neglect privacy issues.61 There are many definitions of “smart cities.”
From the technical perspective of IBM engineer Colin Harrison, the term
denotes an instrumented, interconnected, and intelligent city.62 Privacy
researchers Kelsey Finch and Omer Tene start from a similar definition of
smart cities as growing networks of connected technologies generating
actionable data about the city and its residents ranging from more efficient
permit and licensing systems to new transportation services to improved
infrastructure, but worry that the “scale on which smart cities collect,
analyze, and exploit data about their citizens could set them apart from
any other surveillance mechanism in history.”63 At the same time, smart
cities also have to contend with a host of new issues resulting from (1) the
embrace of “open data,” which requires new risk management tools to
57. Id.
58. See Faiza Patel & Michael Price, Keeping Eyes on NYPD Surveillance, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE (June 13, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/ny-city-council-needs-increasescrutiny-nypd%E2%80%99s-surveillance-arsenal [https://perma.cc/3N7C-3P5U].
59. Levine et al., supra note 55, at 73 (commenting that as of April 2016, the DAS contained the
following records: “two billion readings from license plates (with photos), 100 million summonses,
54 million 911 calls, 15 million complaints, 12 million detective reports, 11 million arrests, two
million warrants, and 30 days of video from 9,000 cameras”). See generally FERGUSON, supra note
14.
60. See infra section II.B.1.
61. See Finch & Tene, supra note 16.
62. Colin Harrison et al., Foundations for Smarter Cities, IBM J. RES. & DEV., July-Aug. 2012, at
1, 2 (noting that smart cities enable the “capture and integration of live real-world data through the
use of sensors, kiosks, meters, personal devices, appliances, cameras, smart phones, implanted
medical devices, the web, and other similar data-acquisition systems, including social networks as
networks of human sensors”).
63. Finch & Tene, supra note 16, at 1606.
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balance the gains from civic innovation against the risks of reidentification and associated privacy harms;64 and (2) cities becoming
“platforms” and therefore having to mediate how citizens as users interact
with smart city technologies and publicly and privately developed apps
for accessing city services and datasets ranging from budget projections
to building permits to parking violations to student disciplinary reports.65
As Finch and Tene point out, this new role provides cities with a golden
opportunity to act as data stewards by setting new norms and standards
around privacy for emerging technologies.66
Finally, the growing emphasis on big data policing and smart city
enhancements to urban quality of life coincide with a third trend: intense
public scrutiny of abusive policing practices such as stop and frisk, racial
profiling, excessive use of force, police perjury, police militarization,
and—most tragically—multiple police shootings of unarmed civilians.67
The common factor in these practices is their malignant effect on racial
minorities, immigrants, the poor, and the most vulnerable in our
communities. The need for police reform provides the broader context and
sense of urgency around cities adopting both local surveillance ordinances
and citywide data privacy principles.
B.

Two Gaps in Privacy Law

Privacy localism helps address two significant gaps in federal and state
privacy regulation. The first is the absence of Fourth Amendment or
statutory protection for personal information collected in public settings.
The second is the absence of federal or state privacy laws applicable to
city agencies that collect, store, use, or share records about individuals
that contain personal information.
1.

The Public Surveillance Gap

Professor Christopher Slobogin recently coined the phrase “panvasive
surveillance” to capture the idea that mass surveillance techniques are

64. Id. at 1611–13. When cities publish thousands of data sets on all kinds of civic functions, they
increase the risk of exposing the sensitive information of local residents. They therefore need tools
for evaluating whether, and how, a sensitive dataset may be released to the public while minimizing
the risk of privacy violations.
65. Id. at 1593–95.
66. Id. at 1607.
67. See generally JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA (2017); BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 6–14 (2017);
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL (2017).
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now “pervasive and invasive,” and affect “huge numbers of people, most
of whom are innocent of any wrongdoing.”68 For reasons that all of these
scholars have readily identified, “the Fourth Amendment is not implicated
by most types of panvasive surveillance.”69 Nor do related federal
electronic surveillance laws (ECPA) offer protection against police use of
panvasive surveillance in public spaces. This results in a gap in the law,
the “public surveillance gap.”
Privacy theory has long recognized the tension between the
surveillance of pedestrians on public streets and the anonymity enjoyed in
public places. In his early and influential analysis of the function of
privacy in a democratic society, Professor Alan Westin identified
anonymity as a “state of privacy” that “occurs when the individual is in
public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom
from identification and surveillance.”70 More recently, Slobogin offered a
sophisticated treatment of “a right to public anonymity,” which he defines
as an assurance that when in public, one is “presumptively nameless . . . as
far as the government is concerned.”71 His primary concern was to
establish a Fourth Amendment basis for “privacy in public.”72 More
specifically, he made the case for applying the reasonable expectation of
privacy test to closed-circuit television (CCTV) operated by the
government in public spaces, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s
contrary holdings in a series of cases described below.73
U.S. Supreme Court precedent establishes that citizens do not generally
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in public. In Katz v. United
States,74 which is best known for Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion
establishing the reasonable expectation of privacy test, Justice Stewart
68. Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1723 (2014) [hereinafter Slobogin, Panvasive
Surveillance]. Other Fourth Amendment scholars have recognized the same phenomenon, although
they call it by different names. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s
“Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 286 (2016); Daphna
Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1051–53
(2016).
69. Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 68, at 1723.
70. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1970).
71. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 91 (2007) [hereinafter SLOGOBIN, PRIVACY AT RISK].
72. Id. at 79–117; see also HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 91 (2010); Andrew D.
Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643 (2013) (applying Nissenbaum’s
theory of contextual integrity to Fourth Amendment analysis); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public,
69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141 (2014).
73. SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK, supra note 71, at 106–17.
74. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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asserted in the majority opinion that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”75 Over the next few years, the Court consistently
held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything seen or
heard from a public vantage point.76 The Court extended this doctrine to
open fields, even if they are secluded and the owner takes steps to shield
them from public view,77 and to naked-eye aerial observation of a person’s
backyard78 or a greenhouse with partially open sides and roof.79 In the
“beeper” cases, which involved police use of radio transmitters to follow
vehicles and their contents on a public road, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply because a “person traveling in an automobile
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.”80
Thus, police use of video cameras, ALPRs, shot detectors, drones, and
facial recognition software—in other words, all the components of the
NYPD’s DAS—would not constitute a search under the plain view or
open fields doctrines or the beeper cases.81 Public surveillance receives
somewhat more protective treatment under United States v. Jones,82 a
2012 case in which the police, acting without a valid warrant, attached a
GPS tracking device to the underside of a drug suspect’s car and tracked
his movement over a period of twenty-eight days. In a majority opinion
authored by Justice Scalia, the Court revived the traditional trespass
theory of the Fourth Amendment to find that the government’s physical
installation of the device constituted a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.83 But in two separate concurrences, five justices rejected the
75. Id. at 351.
76. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
77. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
78. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
79. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). Later cases added the “general public use” exception
under which “surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment
not generally available to the public” might require a warrant. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). But many commentators have disparaged this exception as unworkable
given the rapid pace of technological development and the ready availability of even the most
sophisticated technology. See SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK, supra note 71, at 54–62.
80. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (police tracked a container in a car holding
chemicals used in drug manufacturing). One exception is when use of the device reveals a “critical
fact about the interior of the premises,” which would constitute a search and therefore requires a
warrant. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (police tracked container to inside of
homes).
81. See SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK, supra note 71, at 106–08.
82. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
83. Id. at 404, 409 (as Justice Scalia noted in defending his approach, “[t]he Katz reasonable-
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trespass approach as artificial and irrelevant; they instead directly
confronted the issue of whether long-term GPS monitoring of the
defendant’s vehicle violated his reasonable expectation of privacy under
the Katz test and concluded that it had.84
Justice Alito’s concurrence made this point rather bluntly, stating that
the majority’s reasoning “largely disregards what is really important (the
use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking).”85 Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence went even further, noting that “GPS monitoring
generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations,” which the government
can then store and efficiently “mine . . . for information years into the
future.”86
Jones signals a greater willingness on the part of the Court to confront
new surveillance technologies head-on rather than allow the Fourth
Amendment to atrophy in the contemporary setting. Two more recent
opinions by Chief Justice Roberts continue this trend. In Riley v.
California,87 a unanimous Court held that police require a warrant to
search the information on a cell phone seized incident to an arrest because
cell phones are quantitatively and qualitatively different from other items
found on an arrestee’s person, in part due to the “immense storage
capacity” of modern cell phones.88 And this past term, in Carpenter v.
United States,89 a divided Court held that the government conducts a
search when it accesses historical cell site location information to
determine the location of a suspect over a four-month period.90 As in
Jones (and drawing on Riley), the Carpenter court concluded that such
monitoring is a “new phenomenon” warranting a higher level of
protection than ordinary record requests.91 Thus, the 5-4 majority opinion
adopted a different approach from past cases that both breaks the shackles

expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test . . .”).
84. Id. at 413–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
87. 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
88. Id. at 2478.
89. 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
90. Id. at 2220.
91. Id. at 2216 (characterizing both GPS tracking of a vehicle and cell site location information as
“detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled”).
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of trespass theory and begins chipping away at the third-party doctrine.92
While the Court did not overrule United States v. Miller93 or Smith v.
Maryland,94 it refused to apply the third-party doctrine automatically and
declined to extend it to the collection of cell site location information.95
Instead, the Court announced a “digital-Katz test for surveillance
technologies.”96 This test amounts to a multifactor analysis of data
quantity and quality in a specific technology. The majority found that use
of this particular surveillance technology violated a reasonable
expectation of privacy based on its sensitivity, exhaustiveness, retrieval
cost, capability of reconstructing past movement, and voluntariness of
third-party sharing. But the Court emphasized that its decision was
narrow, while refusing to express a view on other technologies, such as
real-time collection of cell site location information or “tower dumps” (a
technique for collecting all the devices connected to a specific particular
cell site during a particular interval).97
Together, Jones, Riley, and Carpenter suggest that a (sometimes thin)
majority of the Court firmly believes that when surveillance is allencompassing, it may violate society’s reasonable expectations of
privacy, even in cases where the surveillance occurs in public places. And
yet, it is not at all clear that this line of cases will alter the Court’s
treatment of video cameras and the related public surveillance
technologies associated with the DAS.98 Unlike the GPS tracking at issue
in Jones, which consisted of long-term monitoring of a single known
92. Under this doctrine, no search occurs when a person voluntarily turns over data to a third party
such as bank records to a bank or dialed phone numbers to a telecommunications company, because
she assumes the risk these records will be shared outside the company, even with the government.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443
(1976).
93. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
94. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
95. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20.
96. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Future-Proofing the Fourth Amendment, HARV. L. REV.: BLOG
(June
25,
2018),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/future-proofing-the-fourth-amendment/
[https://perma.cc/97SL-WQNY].
97. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. Carpenter generated four dissenting opinions, none of which
were happy with the Court’s new balancing test. Justice Kennedy defended the third-party doctrine,
arguing that it controlled cell site location information; Justice Thomas wanted the Court to reconsider
(and perhaps repeal) the Katz test; Justice Alito worried that the holding would justify challenges to
other court orders (including various kinds of subpoenas); Justice Gorsuch objected to Katz and the
third-party doctrine and hinted at a new property-based test (not confined to trespass) under which a
person might have a sufficient interest in his cell site location information as a form of “papers” to
justify protection under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2223–72.
98. See Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 68, at 1747 (concluding that panvasive
surveillance remains “immune from constitutional review” notwithstanding the decision in Jones).
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target, the DAS components engage in universal monitoring of every
person or vehicle who passes within range of a video camera, license plate
reader, gunshot detector, or drone. These devices passively record and
store images and sounds, which are fed into a prescriptive analytics
program designed to detect suspicious behavior, including abandoned
packages or movement in prohibited areas. If the program triggers an
alarm, a trained police officer reviews and evaluates it, taking into account
other sensor feeds and geocoded records in the vicinity of the alarming
sensor. This prevents the police from deploying resources if the alarm is
a false-positive; however, if the officer judges the alarm to be legitimate,
a police response follows.99 Thus, the DAS bears little resemblance to
GPS tracking because the monitoring capabilities of the DAS are wide,
but not very deep.100
Of course, one can devise a hypothetical in which the NYPD uses the
wide area monitoring of the DAS to track an individual over an extended
period of time. But this is not the intended purpose of the DAS and it
seems more likely that if police sought to track specific individuals over
an extended period, they would rely on GPS tracking devices (as in Jones)
or cell site location information (as in Carpenter). Nonetheless, some
scholars argue that any time the police use a system like the DAS to track
and identify an individual, the courts should treat this as a “search”
requiring a warrant.101 But important differences remain between: (1) the
ordinary use of individual component technologies of the DAS; (2) the
use of the network surveillance capabilities of the DAS when integrated
with predictive analytics to track and identify a suspect over time (which
might happen in the future); and (3) the twenty-eight day GPS monitoring
at issue in Jones or the 127 days of cell phone monitoring at issue in
Carpenter. In short, the ordinary use of the DAS simply does not generate
the comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that animated
the Court’s new line of reasoning in Jones and Carpenter. The absence of
long-term monitoring by the DAS seems like enough of a distinguishing
factor for the Court to adhere to its earlier reasoning in Katz and the pre-

99. Levine, supra note 55, at 74.
100. Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez helped me formulate this distinction.
101. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE
TO
PROTECTING COMMUNITIES AND PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES 28 (2007),
http://constitutionproject.org/pdf/Video_Surveillance_Guidelines_Report_w_Model_Legislation4.p
df [https://perma.cc/27EF-DW7Z] (arguing that law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to using
a public video surveillance system to track or identify an individual); see also Rachel LevinsonWaldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government
Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 602–05 (2017).
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digital cases rather than treat the DAS or its component parts as another
novel technology warranting a different approach.102
So far, this section has focused on the Fourth Amendment gap in
addressing surveillance of public spaces. There is a parallel gap in federal
surveillance laws, which generally do not cover law enforcement use of
video surveillance in public spaces. Congress deliberately omitted video
surveillance from the scope of the Wiretap Act, which otherwise covers
governmental interception of “wire” and “oral” communications.103 And
this omission was not reversed when Congress enacted ECPA, which
extended the Wiretap Act to “electronic communications.”104
Furthermore, the operative provision of the Wiretap Act prohibits the
“interception” of wire, oral, or electronic communications, and video
surveillance does not require “interception” as that term is defined in the
statute.105 Thus, public video surveillance and most other components of
the DAS are beyond the scope of ECPA except to the extent that they
record conversations.106 The norm for CCTV cameras and ALPRs is silent
recording that captures images but not sounds. Nor are gunshot detectors
designed to capture human voices (although occasionally they do, in
which case the Wiretap Act might apply).107
2.

The Fair Information Practices Gap

The Fair Information Practices (FIPs) are the basis for modern privacy
regulation, both in the United States and abroad.108 There are different

102. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (stating that the Court’s decision does not “call into question
conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras”).
103. See PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE
INFORMATION AGE § 6.2.1.A.2 (Kristen J. Mathews ed., 2d ed. 2016) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-541, at
16–17, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3570–71); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 539–
40 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing omission).
104. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 378.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2012).
106. If video surveillance includes sound, it would fall within the definition of “oral
communications” under the Wiretap Act. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW,
supra note 1, at 378.
107. See Alexandra S. Gecas, Gunfire Game Changer or Big Brother’s Hidden Ears?: Fourth
Amendment and Admissibility Quandaries Relating to Shotspotter Technology, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV.
1073, 1096–97 (2016).
108. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 663–65. The FIPs
are a set of internationally recognized privacy principles that date back to the 1970s. They have helped
shape not only the main U.S. privacy statutes but also European data protection law. See generally
FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-
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formulations of the FIPs and they vary as to both the number of principles
and their substantive content. But all versions have in common the
allocation of “rights and responsibilities that are associated with the
transfer and use of personal information.”109
In 1974, Congress enacted the Privacy Act, which regulates the way
federal agencies collect, maintain, use or disseminate the personal
information of individuals.110 The Privacy Act is the first federal law to
embody the FIPs. But it applies only to federal agencies; it does not apply
to the private sector or to state or local agencies.111 Relatively few states
have statutes comparable to the Privacy Act and the ten or so that do vary
widely. For example, New York’s Personal Privacy Protection Act
requires that each state agency “that maintains a system of records” must
comply with the FIPs.112 But the law does not apply to local governments.
Although Washington is one of the few states to have created an Office of
Privacy and Data Protection, whose remit includes updating state agency
privacy policies, consumer education and outreach, monitoring citizen
complaints, and promoting best practices,113 Washington does not have a
state law imposing the FIPs on government agencies.
It follows that there is a gap—a fair information practices gap—that
applies to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information by
most state and city governments. This gap is significant. It means that
most local governments are not required by law to adhere to the FIPs. It
also means that they neglect an equally important aspect of the Privacy
Act, and the more recent E-Government Act, requiring federal agencies
electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000text.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8Y2K-6LD8].
109. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 664.
110. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (2012)) (limiting disclosure, data collection and retention of such information, requiring
various notices, granting a right of access and correction, imposing data security requirements, and
providing enforcement rights).
111. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 666. There is one
exception—the Act’s rules for social security numbers apply beyond federal agencies. Id.
112. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 94 (McKinney 2018). A few other states have similar laws, for
example, California, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS: 2017, 125–26 (2017) [hereinafter SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY
LAW FUNDAMENTALS]; Uniform Information Practices Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 92F-1 (2018)
(Hawaii); Fair Information Practices Act, IND. CODE § 4-1-6 (2018) (Indiana); Government Records
Access and Management Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-101 (West 2018) (Utah). States with much
narrower government records laws include Alaska, Connecticut, and Wisconsin.
113. See
Wash.
Exec.
Order
16-01
(Jan.
5,
2016),
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/exe_order/eo_16-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BGYL5GB]; Office of Privacy and Data Protection Creation Act, H.R. 2875, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2016) (codifying E.O. 16-01).
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to prepare both System of Records Notices (SORNs)114 and Privacy
Impact Assessments (PIAs).115
In sum, the vast majority of states and cities are not bound by the FIPs
when state and local agencies collect, store, use, and disseminate personal
information. Nor do they benefit from related methodologies and practices
like SORNs and PIAs, which require government officials administering
data-rich programs to think about privacy protections and hold them
accountable if they neglect this responsibility.
II.

CASE STUDIES: SEATTLE AND NEW YORK CITY

The case for privacy localism rests on the idea that local autonomy
helps promote laboratories for democracy as well as participatory
opportunities for citizens. There is little question that states have played
this role when acting as first movers in identifying and regulating
emerging privacy concerns and enabling simultaneous experimentation
with multiple policy solutions. As noted above, California has a long
history of enacting innovative privacy laws that have shaped privacy and
security standards on a national basis,116 and recently passed a new
consumer privacy law with national implications.117 This Part argues that
the time is ripe to expand this characterization of the benefits of local
114. Federal agencies must publish SORNs in the Federal Register when they maintain personal
information in system of records and the information is retrieved by a personal identifier. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(e)(4) (2012). SORNs serve two salutary purposes: they provide (1) notice to the public about
their rights under the Privacy Act and (2) useful information for privacy advocates, alerting them to
new government databases and thereby enabling them to analyze whether these databases comply
with federal law. See Jeramie D. Scott, DoD Claim that NSA in Compliance with Privacy Act Ring
Hollow, EPIC: PRIVACY RTS. BLOG (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:31 PM), http://epic.org/blog/2015/02/dodclaim-nsa-in-compliance-with-the-privacy-act-when-it-clearly-is-n.html
[https://perma.cc/G3J8TLA6]. Second, they force agencies to continually examine and rationalize their own policies and
practices (as a prelude to issuing new SORNs).
115. Section 208 of the E-Government Act of 2002 requires agencies to conduct a PIA before
developing or procuring IT systems or initiating projects that collect, maintain, or disseminate
personal information from or about members or the public. See Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208-b, 116
Stat. 2899, 2921–22 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012)). The purpose of a PIA is to
demonstrate that program managers and system owners have consciously incorporated privacy
protections throughout the development of a system or program. Agencies are required to make PIAs
publicly available through publication in the Federal Register or through a posting on the agency
websites, subject to certain exceptions. See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, M-03-22, OMB GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE
E-GOVERNMENT
ACT
OF
2002
(2003),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22 [https://perma.cc/LJH5-VN4V].
116. See Hogan Lovells, California Continues to Shape Privacy and Data Security Standards,
IAPP: PRIVACY TRACKER (Oct. 1, 2013), https://iapp.org/news/a/california-continues-to-shapeprivacy-and-data-security-standards/ [https://perma.cc/39RS-AMXV].
117. Goldman, supra note 47.
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policymaking from states to cities. It explores in detail the experiments
with privacy localism in Seattle and New York City. Both cities have
enacted or introduced local surveillance ordinances. Both are subject to
ongoing judicial oversight related to police practices and abuses. Both
have imposed citywide privacy laws while embracing open data
programs. Accordingly, they are similar enough for comparison, yet their
experiments in privacy also reflect profound differences in their political
and cultural make-up, not least of which is New York’s direct experience
with the devastating 9/11 terrorist attacks.
There are two additional arguments in favor of privacy localism. The
first is the new emphasis on governance rules and agency design as
solutions to Fourth Amendment doctrinal deficiencies and the lack of
transparency and accountability in modern policing. Legal scholars such
as Christopher Slobogin,118 Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko,119
and Daphna Renan120 have all turned to administrative law as a new source
of insight into these longstanding problems. And privacy localism
perfectly exemplifies this administrative turn by relying on locally elected
officials to establish policy and exercise discretion in applying local rules
in a reasonable manner. The second is that privacy localism in Seattle and
New York City seem remarkably successful in addressing the public
surveillance gap and the fair information practices gaps.
A.

Seattle

Seattle is Washington State’s largest and fastest-growing city, with an
estimated 2017 population of about 725,000.121 It has a vibrant local

118. See Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 68.
119. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827
(2015).
120. See Renan, supra note 68.
121. U.S. Census Bureau estimates rank Seattle as the eighteenth largest city in the United States.
It has a metropolitan area population of over 4,500,000, the thirteenth largest in the country. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1,
2017
[hereinafter
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
ANNUAL
ESTIMATES],
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
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economy122 and a lower crime rate than most medium-size U.S. cities.123
The City has not experienced a large-scale terrorist act involving major
loss of life or serious property damage, although several smaller terrorist
incidents have occurred.124 Thus, for most residents, life in Seattle is not
colored by a fear of crime or terrorist attacks nor has the Seattle Police
Department (SPD) implemented heightened security measures designed
to prevent or respond to such attacks.
Although Seattle’s elected offices are officially non-partisan, the city
is staunchly liberal with a heavy Democratic tilt.125 Washington State has
a roughly even divide between Democrats and Republicans, but
Democrats control the governor’s office, the State House of
Representatives, and the State Senate.126 In a recent study calculating the
level of conservatism of all U.S. cities with a population above 20,000,
Seattle ranked as the third most liberal city.127
In Seattle, the mayor appoints the chief of police, who serves at the
mayor’s pleasure.128 The SPD is relatively small, with approximately
1,400 sworn officers (about twenty officers per 10,000 residents) and a
2016 budget of about $320 million out of a total citywide budget of
$5.1 billion.129 It has a mixed history with privacy protection/regulation.
122. The city/region is home to major high-tech and aerospace firms such as Amazon, Microsoft,
Starbucks, and Boeing, the fifth largest U.S. container port, and a globally recognized public
university, the University of Washington. See Gregory Lewis McNamee, Seattle, Washington, United
States,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
(last
updated
Oct.
4,
2018),
https://www.britannica.com/place/Seattle-Washington [https://perma.cc/X2D5-HHET].
123. See Violent Crime Statistics for Every City in America, CBS CHI. (Oct. 22, 2015, 5:00 PM),
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2015/10/22/violent-crime-statistics-for-every-city-in-america/
[https://perma.cc/Y7YJ-W6CN].
124. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MGMT., CITY OF SEATTLE, SHIVA – THE SEATTLE HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION
AND
VULNERABILITY
ANALYSIS
(2014),
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Emergency/PlansOEM/SHIVA/SHIVAv6.3Final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/f5zx-jv7g].
125. Here’s How Seattle Voters’ Support for Trump Compared to other Cities’, SEATTLE TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2016, 6:45 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/heres-how-seattlevoters-support-for-trump-stacks-up-to-other-u-s-cities/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (eighty-seven
percent of Seattle voters supported Clinton over Trump in the 2016 election).
126. See Jennifer Bendery, Democrats in Washington State Win Full Control of the Government,
HUFFPOST (Nov. 7, 2017, 11:33 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/washington-statesenate-special-election_us_5a00a45be4b0baea2633bfae [https://perma.cc/SPR4-CYCL].
127. See Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government,
108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 609 (2014) (basing rankings on recent large-scale population surveys
regarding public policy).
128. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF SEATTLE, 2017–2018 PROPOSED BUDGET 369,
https://www.seattle.gov/financedepartment/17proposedbudget/documents/SPD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/32H8-Y2XX] (overview of the Seattle Police Department).
129. CITY
OF
SEATTLE,
2016
PROPOSED
BUDGET
15,
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On the one hand, the SPD is more transparent than most American police
forces. For example, the SPD police manual is publicly available on the
internet and it covers departmental standards, values, policies, and
practices across a range of operational and personnel issues.130 On the
other hand, the SPD has some history of misconduct involving
surveillance and use of force. Notable incidents include spying on
political protests in the 1960s and 1970s131; inadequately preparing for the
1999 World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle, where 100,000
protestors disrupted the conference and engaged in minor rioting132; using
a stun gun on a seven-months-pregnant African-American woman after
she was stopped for going twelve miles over the speed limit and refused
to get out of her car or sign her speeding ticket133; and two racially-charged
use-of-force incidents in 2010, one involving a fatal shooting of a Native
American experiencing a mental health crisis,134 the other involving the
kicking, beating, and berating of two handcuffed Latino suspects.135
In 2011, the DOJ announced an investigation of the SPD based in part
on these widely publicized incidents.136 The investigation found that the
SPD routinely used excessive force and followed policing practices that

http://www.seattle.gov/financedepartment/16proposedbudget/documents/16proposedbudgetexecsu
mmary.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKL4-HM5S].
130. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF SEATTLE, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL (2018)
[hereinafter SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL], https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual
[https://perma.cc/YA7Z-78T2]; see Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1848 (identifying
Chicago and Seattle as among the few cities with publicly available police manuals).
131. Michael Sweeney, Seattle Law Limits Police in Intelligence Gathering, WASH. POST (July 3,
1979), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/07/03/seattle-law-limits-police-inintelligence-gathering/916c9159-31da-4a1f-ab55-9804ba5efa19/?utm_term=.d842564b88e8
[https://perma.cc/7T8F-6ZSN].
132. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Seattle Police Chief Resigns in Aftermath of Protests, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/08/us/seattle-police-chief-resigns-in-aftermath-ofprotests.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
133. Adam Liptak, A Ticket, 3 Taser Jolts and, Perhaps, a Trip to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(May 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/us/police-taser-use-on-pregnant-woman-goesbefore-supreme-court.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
134. See Lynda V. Mapes, Carver’s Death a Violent End to a Tormented Life, SEATTLE TIMES
(Oct. 15, 2010, 10:00 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/carvers-death-a-violent-endto-a-tormented-life/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
135. See Steve Miletich & Sara Jean Green, Video of SPD Officer Kicking Prone Man Sparks
Internal
Investigation,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(May
8,
2010,
11:25
PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/video-of-spd-officer-kicking-prone-man-sparks-internalinvestigation/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
136. See Mike Carter, Justice Department to Investigate Seattle Police Civil-Rights Practices,
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011, 9:22 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/justicedepartment-to-investigate-seattle-police-civil-rights-practices/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
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could lead to discriminatory or biased policing.137 Although the City of
Seattle initially objected to these findings, in 2012 it entered into a consent
decree requiring the city to adopt new policies and provide training
designed to address excessive force.138 Five years later, the federal
monitor overseeing court-ordered police reforms praised the SPD for
achieving a dramatic turnaround but then refused to find the police
department in compliance with its federally mandated obligations, due in
part to a June 2017 incident in which two white officers fatally shot
Charleena Lyles, a thirty-year-old African-American mother of four.139
The city objected, and six months later, James Robart, a federal district
court judge in Seattle, found the SPD in “full and effective compliance”
with the court-ordered police reforms.140
1.

Seattle’s Surveillance Ordinances and Body Camera Policy

The 2013 Ordinance—In 2013, the Seattle City Council approved a
bill and ordinance requiring city departments to obtain council approval
prior to acquiring and using certain surveillance equipment.141 One
explicit goal of the ordinance—which was the first of its kind in the
country—was “to avoid creating a constant and pervasive surveillance
137. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE
DEPARTMENT
2
(2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/
spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK6L-S7TS].
138. The Consent Decree
calls for the restoration of constitutional policing through substantial and far-reaching reform of
the SPD’s use of force policies and practices, training, full and complete implementation of new
policy, adoption of policies and training to eliminate discriminatory policing, and the
development of improved relations, trust, and support among and from all of Seattle’s many and
varied communities.
Seattle Consent Decree: How It Came About, What It Is, and What the Monitor Does, SEATTLE
POLICE MONITOR (2017), http://www.seattlemonitor.com/overview/ [https://perma.cc/9S5R-7HVD].
139. Steve Miletich, Despite Progress, Seattle Police Not Yet in Compliance with Reforms, Federal
Monitor Says, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017, 4:24 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/crime/despite-progress-seattle-police-not-yet-in-compliance-with-reforms-federal-monitorsays/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018). But see Steve Miletich, Seattle Police Dispute Monitor’s Report,
Say They’ve Met Federal Reform Standards, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017, 3:37 PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seattle-police-dispute-monitors-report-say-theyvemet-federal-reform-standards/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
140. Steve Miletich, Seattle Asks Federal Judge to Find It in Compliance with Court-Ordered
Police Reforms, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/in-watershed-moment-seattle-asks-federal-judge-to-find-it-in-compliance-with-court-orderedreforms/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
141. See SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124142 (Mar. 18, 2013) (codified at SEATTLE, WASH.
MUN.
CODE
§ 14.18)
[hereinafter
SEATTLE
SURVEILLANCE
ORDINANCE],
http://clerk.seattle.gov/~scripts/nph-brs.exe?d=ORDF&s1=117730.cbn.&Sect6=
HITOFF&l=20&p=1&u=/~public/cbor1.htm&r=1&f=G [https://perma.cc/QHM2-U2HW].
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presence in public life.”142 Relying on a consensus approach, the coalition
of privacy advocates who initially sought the ordinance collaborated with
representatives of the mayor, police chief and county prosecutor, all of
whom were represented on the drafting committee that eventually wrote
the law.143
The city council adopted the surveillance equipment ordinance
following negative media reports and a public outcry in response to two
incidents: the city’s secretive acquisition of two small drones and its
installation of surveillance cameras (along with a “mesh network”) at
Seattle’s waterfront.144 Both were funded by a $5 million federal grant.145
The SPD behaved secretively in both cases by failing to consult with or
notify the city council or the public prior to acquiring or installing the
equipment.146
The ordinance required SPD and other city agencies to obtain council
approval before deploying “surveillance equipment.”147 More
specifically, it obligated the SPD to develop operational and data
management protocols for all such equipment.148 The operational
protocols addressed the proper deployment, acquisition, and use of the
equipment including information on its purpose, type, specific location,
and use; its effect on privacy and anonymity rights and how any potential
abuses of these rights would be mitigated; a description of data collection
practices (including the extent of any real-time monitoring and how data
would be used, accessed, retained and shared with other city departments);
and a public outreach plan for affected communities.149 The data
management protocols required the SPD to submit written protocols
addressing, at a more granular level, how data collected by the
surveillance equipment would be retained, stored, indexed, and
accessed.150

142. Id.
143. Sweeney, supra note 131.
144. Christine Clarridge, Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013,
9:33 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020312864_spddronesxml.html (last visited Oct.
21, 2018); Christine Clarridge, Waterfront Surveillance Cameras Stir Privacy Fears, SEATTLE TIMES
(Jan.
31,
2013,
8:45
PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/latestnews/2020260670_
waterfrontcamerasxml.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
145. Clarridge, Waterfront Surveillance Cameras Stir Privacy Fears, supra note 144.
146. Crump, supra note 23.
147. SEATTLE SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE, supra note 141.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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The 2013 surveillance ordinance represented a big step by the SPD
toward transparency and accountability in public surveillance. But it had
shortcomings, too. First, it defined “surveillance equipment” very
narrowly, covering “drones or unmanned aircraft and any attached
equipment used to collect data” but excluding many other types of
equipment such as body-worn cameras, traffic cameras, and security
cameras.151 Second, the city council adopted a last-minute proposal by the
SPD to significantly widen an exemption for using surveillance
equipment for purposes of criminal investigations under exigent
circumstances.152 This change expanded the exemption to cover
investigations supported by reasonable suspicion.153 Third, and most
importantly, the 2013 ordinance lacked any enforcement mechanism that
would impose specific penalties on the SPD if it failed to seek approval
or submit the required protocols in a timely fashion.154 And that is exactly
what happened.
The 2017 Ordinance—In the spring of 2017, a combination of media
exposure and revived public backlash led the city council to reconsider
the effectiveness of the 2013 ordinance and begin work on replacing it.
The SPD had purchased and begun using a social media tracking tool
called Geofeedia, without seeking approval by the city council or
submitting the required protocols.155 This controversial decision
illustrated the lack of clarity over the scope of the 2013 ordinance and

151. Id. The Seattle Police Department Manual addressed a few of these scenarios but mainly from
an operational standpoint. See SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL, supra note 130, at ch. 16.090
(in car video system); id. ch. 16.091 (body-worn video pilot program); id. ch. 16.170 (automatic
license plate readers).
152. Phil Mocek, Updates to Seattle Surveillance Equipment Bill, MOCEK.ORG (Mar. 15, 2013),
https://mocek.org/blog/2013/03/15/updates-to-seattle-surveillance-equipment-bill/
[https://perma.cc/9HQY-N3S2]; Phil Mocek, Seattle City Council Pass Ordinance Restricting
Surveillance Equipment After Councilmember Harrell Slips in a Gift for Police, MOCEK.ORG (Mar.
19, 2013), https://mocek.org/blog/2013/03/19/seattle-passes-ordinance-restricting-surveillance-afterharrell-slips-in-gift-for-police/ [https://perma.cc/VS7H-4BE6].
153. SEATTLE SURVEILLANCE ORDINANCE, supra note 141. For a detailed account of how this
came to pass, see Phil Mocek, Updates to Seattle Surveillance Equipment Bill, supra note 152; Phil
Mocek, Seattle City Council Pass Ordinance Restricting Surveillance Equipment After
Councilmember Harrell Slips in a Gift for Police, supra note 152.
154. See Press Release, ACLU Wash., ACLU Urges City Council to Put Teeth into Surveillance
Law, Delay Vote to Add Auditing Process (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/acluurges-city-council-put-teeth-surveillance-law-delay-vote-add-auditing-process
[https://perma.cc/ZU9Y-GD3U].
155. Ansel Herz, How the Seattle Police Secretly—and Illegally—Purchased a Tool for Tracking
Your
Social
Media
Posts,
STRANGER
(Sept.
28,
2016),
https://www.thestranger.com/news/2016/09/28/24585899/how-the-seattle-police-secretlyandillegallypurchased-a-tool-for-tracking-your-social-media-posts [https://perma.cc/F2QX-PHUZ].
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whether it applied only to hardware or to software as well. An SPD
spokesperson told a local newspaper that the Geofeedia purchase “‘should
have been cleared . . . in accordance with the Seattle Municipal Code’”156
(i.e., the surveillance equipment ordinance), while a local TV station
reported that according to sources inside the police department, “the
[surveillance equipment ordinance] applies only to hardware like
cameras, not software like Geofeedia.”157 A few weeks later, the ACLU
of Northern California blogged that it had obtained records showing that
Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram provided user data access to Geofeedia,
and that Facebook and Instagram had already cut off Geofeedia’s access
to company data.158 In any case, the SPD clearly did not seek approval
from the city council or develop any of the required protocols in this case
or—quite possibly—in any other case involving covered surveillance
equipment between 2013 and 2017.
In developing a new ordinance, the City Council convened a
stakeholder working group consisting of council staff, key staff from the
mayor’s office, the city IT and law departments, and the SPD, along with
advocacy groups led by the ACLU-WA. The group met over the course
of several months to discuss and revise a draft ordinance developed by the
ACLU-WA.159 The revised ordinance, which the mayor signed into law
on August 2, 2017,160 repealed and replaced the 2013 ordinance, changing
it in a number of ways, several of which are worth highlighting.
To begin with, the new ordinance jettisons “surveillance equipment” in
favor of two newly defined terms: “surveillance technology,” broadly
defined as “any electronic device, software program, or hosted software
156. Id.
157. See Essex Porter, OPA Investigates Reported SPD Acquisition of Tool that Tracks Social
Media Posts, KIRO 7 (Sept. 29, 2016, 8:18 PM), http://www.kiro7.com/news/local/opa-investigatesreported-spd-acquisition-of-tool-that-tracks-social-media-posts/451898379 [https://perma.cc/F4EGDBYL].
158. See Matt Cagle, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access for a Surveillance
Product Marketed to Target Activists of Color, ACLU OF N. CAL. (Oct. 11, 2016),
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/facebook-instagram-and-twitter-provided-data-access-surveillanceproduct-marketed-target (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). Twitter soon followed. See Ally Marotti &
Tribune News Servs., Twitter Cuts off Chicago Startup Geofeedia After ACLU Reports Police
Surveillance,
CHI.
TRIBUNE
(Oct.
11,
2016,
12:05
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-twitter-suspends-geofeedia-access-bsi20161011-story.html [https://perma.cc/NC5K-LPHE].
159. Email from Mary F. Perry, Dir. of Transparency & Privacy, Seattle Police Dep’t to Ira
Rubinstein, Senior Fellow, Info. Law Inst., NYU (Sept. 11, 2017, 9:21 AM) (on file with author);
Memorandum from Amy Tsai to Gender Equity, Safe Cmtys. & New Ams. Comm. (June 28, 2017),
http://seattle.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=5285300&GUID=80E7C8BB-BAA2-4975-BED5BE523C258367 [https://perma.cc/NE4N-TJD3].
160. SEATTLE, WASH. MUN. CODE § 14.18 (amended 2017).
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solution that is designed or primarily intended to be used for the purpose
of surveillance,” subject to various exceptions and exemptions that
resemble those in place under the 2013 ordinance161; and “surveillance
data,” defined as “any electronic data collected, captured, recorded,
retained, processed, intercepted, or analyzed by surveillance technology
acquired by the City or operated at the direction of the City.”162 This
revision significantly broadens the scope of the ordinance. Indeed, the
definition of “surveillance data” was among the most hotly debated issues
in the city council hearings. The SPD objected that an overly broad
definition would render the ordinance unworkable.163 The ACLU-WA
worried that a narrow definition would undermine transparency and
accountability.164 In the end, the city council split the difference by linking
“surveillance data” to technology “acquired by the City or operated at the
direction of the City.”165
The 2017 ordinance also imposes a new obligation on departments
filing surveillance impact reports to conduct community outreach prior to
council approval.166 And it narrows the exigent circumstances exception,
which previously allowed temporary use of surveillance equipment in
advance of council approval based on a criminal investigation supported
by reasonable suspicion, but now requires a showing of imminent risk of
death or serious injury.167 This is a much higher standard. Finally, the
ordinance adds several new oversight and enforcement provisions
including a private right of action against the city for injunctive or
declaratory relief for any material violation of the new bill, after a ninetyday opportunity for the city department to address the concern.168 As a
practical matter, however, a requirement that all city departments create
an inventory of existing surveillance technologies and process them for

161. Id. § 14.18.010.
162. Id.
163. See infra text following note 355 for further discussion.
164. See Seattle Adopts Nation’s Strongest Regulations for Surveillance Technology, ACLU
WASH. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/seattle-adopts-nation%E2%80%99sstrongest-regulations-surveillance-technology [https://perma.cc/JLN3-T3CK]. Presumably, this
excludes data acquired by the city from independent sources such as DHS or state and local agencies
sharing surveillance data with a regional fusion center. Although the ACLU praised the final bill, it
also called upon the council to enact a future ordinance ensuring that Seattle’s acquisition and sharing
of surveillance data is fully regulated, citing the vulnerability of immigrants and refugees to federal
enforcement if there are inadequate controls on data sharing. Id.
165. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 14.18.010.
166. Id. § 14.18.020(C).
167. Id. § 14.18.030(C)(1).
168. Id. §§ 14.18.060–.070.
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council approval at a rate of at least one per month169 may prove even
more burdensome than potential lawsuits depending on the number of
such technologies, which may be very high in light of the broader
definitions discussed above.
The ACLU-WA praised the replacement ordinance as “the strongest
measure adopted by an American city to regulate the acquisition of
surveillance technology.”170 In fact, the new Seattle ordinance compares
very favorably with strong measures recently adopted in Santa Clara
County, California171 and in Oakland.172 There is little reason to analyze
these ordinances at length because Seattle borrowed from them
extensively.
The Body Camera Policy—Seattle has also moved ahead with plans
to improve public safety and enhance police accountability by requiring
patrol officers to wear body cameras.173 Both policymakers and advocacy
groups believe that body cameras, if properly deployed, can help protect
the public against police misconduct and the police against false
accusations of abuse.174 Police use of body cameras raises several difficult
policy issues. These include where to set the limits on police discretion
over when to record; the privacy interests of victims, suspects, thirdparties, and the police; whether to use body cameras inside the home and
other private spaces; and how to apply the FIPs to the retention,
disclosure, and secondary uses of body camera video footage.175 In
comparison with the locally-negotiated surveillance ordinance, the city
did not have as free a hand in resolving these issues locally. Rather, state

169. Id. § 14.18.070(3).
170. Seattle Adopts Nation’s Strongest Regulations for Surveillance Technology, ACLU WASH.,
supra note 165.
171. SANTA CLARA CTY., CAL., OR. NS-300.897 (2016) (codified at SANTA CLARA CTY. ORD.
CODE § A40); see Kevin Forestieri, Santa Clara County Cracks Down on Police Surveillance
Technology: New Law Aims to Increase Transparency and Public Control over Police Tech, PALO
ALTO ONLINE (June 20, 2016, 7:34 AM), https://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/2016/06/18/countycracks-down-on-police-surveillance-technology [https://perma.cc/LZY8-BBAG].
172. Cyrus Farivar, Oakland Passes “Strongest” Surveillance Oversight Law in US, ARS
TECHNICA (May 3, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/05/oakland-passesstrongest-surveillance-oversight-law-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/YEU9-UGS8].
173. Jennifer Sullivan, SPD to Test Body Cameras on a Dozen Officers, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 24,
2014, 9:37 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/spd-to-test-body-cameras-on-a-dozenofficers/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2018).
174. See generally Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, a
Win for All, ACLU (Oct. 2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D573-N6C9].
175. Id.
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legislation and the federal courts both greatly influenced the body camera
policies Seattle eventually adopted.
The SPD began experimenting with body cameras in 2014 with a small
pilot program involving a dozen officers.176 Immediately it had to contend
with two thorny issues under state law: whether the use of body cameras
violated Washington State’s all-party consent rule and whether body
camera footage would be accessible to the public under Washington’s
very expansive public disclosure law.
The Washington Privacy Act requires that all parties to a private
conversation must consent to an audio recording, although it also states
that the consent obligation may be satisfied if any of the parties announces
that they will be recording the conversation in a reasonable manner so
long as the recording contains that announcement.177 The SPD
circumvented this problem by initially recording only video and not
audio.178 An advisory opinion from the Washington State Office of the
Attorney General later clarified that the “Washington Privacy Act does
not require officer consent because the Washington [State] Supreme Court
has recognized that a conversation between a police officer and a member
of the public that occurs in the performance of the officer’s duties is not
private.”179
Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA) creates a presumption of “full
access to information concerning the conduct of every level of
government” and generally trumps other laws that conflict with its openaccess mandate.180 The PRA recognizes the right to privacy as a possible
exemption from disclosure but defines the right very narrowly181 and
imposes a policy of construing all exemptions narrowly.182 Thus, the
Washington State Supreme Court held in Fisher Broadcasting Seattle TV

176. Sullivan, supra note 173.
177. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.03(3) (2018).
178. Sullivan, supra note 173.
179. Wash. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 8, Video and Audio Recording of Communications Between
Citizens and Law Enforcement Officers Using Body Cameras Attached to Police Uniforms (Nov. 24,
2014), http://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/video-and-audio-recording-communications-betweencitizens-and-law-enforcement-officers [https://perma.cc/Q8Q3-YFQ6]. The clear majority of states
follow a “one-party consent” rule so this is not an issue in these jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 25.00–.05 (McKinney 2017).
180. See Nissen v. Pierce County, 183 Wash. App. 581, 589–90, 333 P.3d 577, 581–82 (2014)
(citing Neighborhood All. of Spokane Cty. v. Spokane Cty., 172 Wash. 2d 702, 714–15, 261 P.3d
119, 125–26 (2011)).
181. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050.
182. Id. § 42.56.030; see, e.g., Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Wash. v. Wash. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 123
Wash. App. 656, 662, 98 P.3d 537, 541 (2004).
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LLC v. City of Seattle183 that police body camera footage in Washington
is generally subject to disclosure under the PRA.184 And this remains the
rule even when gross privacy violations may result from the release of
unredacted footage.185 Indeed, Washington’s PRA allows requests for
police video that are “both anonymous and massively broad.”186 This
policy almost halted the SPD pilot program before it even began.
In September 2014, a local programmer named Tim Cleamans filed an
anonymous request for “every single video” the SPD ever recorded.187
SPD’s legal advisor on PRA issues, Mary Perry—who had argued and
lost Fisher Broadcasting—concluded that the under this ruling the police
could withhold video footage only in cases under pending litigation.188 If
acted on, Cleamans’s request would have been a financial and logistical
nightmare. After all, the PRA still required the SPD to review and redact
video footage under any applicable privacy exemptions before releasing
it and at that time the process was “manual, a painstaking, frame-by-frame
ordeal.”189 Eventually, the SPD approached Cleamans and the two sides
reached an informal détente in which Cleamans agreed to withdraw his
request if the SPD would automatically redact body camera footage and
make it available online.190 With Cleamans’s help, the SPD then
sponsored a “hackathon” to refine the automated redaction system and
launched a YouTube channel featuring footage from the pilot program,
with the images automatically blurred and the audio muted.191 The SPD
hired Cleamans as a consultant for six months but after a dispute he
resigned and immediately wrote a program for automating requests for the
footage, enabling him to file over 2,000 requests over the next year.192
183. 180 Wash. 2d 515, 326 P.3d 688 (2014).
184. Id. at 535, 326 P.3d at 698 (requiring agencies to justify non-disclosure of video on a case-bycase basis).
185. See McKenzie Funk, Should We See Everything a Cop Sees?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/magazine/police-body-cameras.html?_r=0 (last visited Oct.
27, 2018) (describing one such example involving video footage of a woman apparently overdosing
on meth, claiming she is pregnant, and being restrained and administered medical aid).
186. Mark Harris, The Body Cam Hacker Who Schooled the Police, WIRED (May 22, 2015),
https://www.wired.com/2015/05/the-body-cam-hacker-who-schooled-the-police/
[https://perma.cc/5JGZ-KHUA].
187. See Funk, supra note 185.
188. Id.
189. Id. (noting that the SPD “was then sitting on more than 1.5 million individual dashcam and
surveillance videos, or about 300,000 hours and 350 terabytes total”).
190. Id.
191. Id.; see also S.P.D. BodyWornVideo, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/
channel/UCcdSPRNt1HmzkTL9aSDfKuA [https://perma.cc/94PA-9D62].
192. Funk, supra note 185. Cleamans also persisted in uploading unredacted video footage to
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Meanwhile, in 2015, the federal monitor appointed by Judge Robart to
oversee Seattle police reforms endorsed the use of body cameras by
officers, calling them a key tool for accountability and transparency.193
Thereafter, the SPD conducted a six-month pilot program to evaluate
body camera technology and equipment during field use.194 In
consultation with officers who had participated in the pilot and
community stakeholders, it developed a policy regulating both in-car and
body-worn video. In 2015 and again in 2016, the Seattle City Council
imposed a proviso to the city budget that would not be lifted until the
Council was satisfied that the SPD had engaged in an extensive
community outreach process regarding this policy. In January 2017, the
Council removed the proviso following the SPD’s completion of agreedupon outreach efforts.195 The SPD then submitted a draft body camera
policy to the Council addressing some of the stakeholder concerns
discussed during the outreach events.196
On May 3, 2017, Judge Robart approved this policy over the objections
of the ACLU-WA and others.197 The ACLU noted a “confusion of
purpose” in the SPD policy: was the goal police accountability or
evidence-gathering for criminal prosecution? Clearly the two differ and
may diverge. In addition, they argued that the police retained too much
discretion to turn cameras on and off. Finally, they pointed to the risk that
that body cameras might become a generalized surveillance tool rather
than an accountability measure, with predictable results.198
By this point in the SPD rollout, the Washington State Legislature had
provided some temporary relief to Seattle and other cities facing massive
public record requests by (1) amending the PRA to exempt body camera
video recordings from disclosure if nondisclosure was essential for the

YouTube, including some highly invasive and embarrassing scenes of the police interviewing a sex
worker who reveals her name, address, email address, and telephone number in the video.
193. Steve Miletich, Time for SPD Officers to Wear Body Cameras ‘Is Now,’ Federal Monitor
Says, SEATTLE TIMES (June 16, 2015, 4:07 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/time-forspd-officers-to-wear-body-cameras-is-now-federal-monitor-says/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
194. See Memorandum from Amy Tsai, Council Staff, to Gender Equity, Safe Cmtys. & New Ams.
Comm. (Feb. 22, 2017) (on file with author).
195. Id.
196. The draft policy is reprinted in the Tsai Memorandum, while the final policy is now available
in the SPD Manual. Id.; see SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL, supra note 130, at § 16.090.
197. Steve Miletich, Federal Judge Approves Body-Camera Plan for Seattle Police, SEATTLE
TIMES (May 4, 2017, 5:29 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/federal-judgeapproves-body-camera-plan-for-seattle-police/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
198. See Shankar Narayan, Police Body-Worn Cameras: Not a Panacea, 71 NW. LAW. 32, 34
(2017).
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protection of a person’s privacy, and (2) creating a presumption that
disclosure of certain recordings is offensive to a reasonable person in
various sensitive settings or situations (home interiors, medical facilities,
an “intimate” image, a minor, and so on).199 The amendments also made
it much harder to request video footage in bulk.200
This temporary fix (most of these provisions will expire in 2019) also
requires that any law enforcement agency deploying body cameras adopt
a policy addressing, at a minimum: (1) activation/deactivation
requirements, and officer discretion in this regard; (2) how to respond to
a person’s unwillingness to communicate with an officer who is recording
the communication; (3) requirements for documenting when and why a
camera was deactivated prior to the conclusion of an interaction with a
member of the public; (4) requirements for notifying a member of the
public that he or she is being recorded, including instances where the
person finds spoken English challenging; (5) training requirements on
body camera usage; and (6) security rules to protect data collected and
stored from body cameras.201 However, the legislation neither settled the
disputes over these contested issues nor established any specific
substantive requirements. Rather, it created a “Task Force on Body Worn
Cameras” to further examine police use of body cameras and submit its
findings and recommendations to the governor and state legislature by
December 1, 2017.202 The Task Force’s report included recommendations
on some issues (such as clarifying the definition of “special exemptions”
in the PRA, modifying the definitions of “intimate image” and “minors,”
and clarifying the retention requirement) but left other issues unresolved
(such as whether to strike or retain the provision barring a PRA requestor
who prevails in litigation over body camera video from recovering fees
and statutory penalties unless the agency acted with bad faith or gross
negligence).203
This left Seattle with one final issue to tackle: negotiating a new
contract with the two SPD unions that had voiced concerns about the
effects of a body camera program on patrol officers’ working conditions,

199.
200.
201.
202.

See H.B. 2362, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2016 Wash. Sess. Laws 780 (2016).
See generally WASH REV. CODE § 42.56.240(14) (2018).
Wash. H.B. 2362 § 5.
JOINT LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF BODY WORN CAMERAS, COMMITTEE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2017), http://leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/Archive/UBWC/
Documents/UBWC-FinalRpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5S2-ABE4].
203. Compare id. at 1–23, with Letter from Shankar Narayan, Tech. and Liberty Project Dir.,
ACLU Wash., to Joint Legislative Task Force (Dec. 15, 2017) (printed in COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 202, at 31).
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discipline, and privacy.204 But rather than delaying full deployment of the
body cameras pending completion of union negotiations, in July 2017,
then Seattle Mayor Ed Murray issued an executive order calling for
deployment of body cameras to all patrol officers in downtown Seattle by
September 30, 2017, and a citywide roll-out thereafter.205 Although the
executive order stated that collective bargaining with the police unions
would continue prior to and after implementation of the court-approved
program, this riled the Seattle police officers’ union, leading it to file an
unfair labor practice complaint that is still pending as of this writing.206
2.

Seattle’s Privacy Program

The Privacy Initiative—In 2014, Seattle launched a Privacy Initiative
aimed at providing greater transparency into the city’s data collection and
use practices.207 Moving beyond the narrow focus of the surveillance
ordinance, this new initiative sought to ensure that the city took
“appropriate steps to facilitate the collection, use, and disposal of data in
a manner that balances the needs of the City to conduct its business with
individual privacy, in a manner that builds public trust.”208 As part of the
Privacy Initiative, Mayor Murray convened a group of stakeholders from
across city departments (including the SPD) to establish a set of governing
principles, devise an approach to educating city departments on privacy
204. Steve Miletich, Rebuffing Union, Mayor Murray Orders Seattle Police to Begin Wearing Body
Cameras, SEATTLE TIMES (July 18, 2017, 1:46 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/crime/rebuffing-union-mayor-murray-orders-seattle-police-to-begin-wearing-body-cameras/
(last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
205. Seattle Mayor Exec. Order 2017-03 (July 17, 2017), http://murray.seattle.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/EO-2017-03-body-worn-cameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8LR-66GK]; see
also Press Release, Office of the Mayor, Mayor Murray Signs Executive Order Requiring Body
Cameras on Patrol Officers (July 17, 2017), http://murray.seattle.gov/mayor-murray-signs-executiveorder-requiring-body-cameras-patrol-officers/ [https://perma.cc/43CT-FVGK].
206. Steve Miletich, State Labor Board to Hear Seattle Police Complaint over Use of Body
Cameras, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 24, 2017, 8:52 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/crime/state-labor-board-to-hear-seattle-police-complaint-over-use-of-body-cameras/
(last
visited Dec. 2, 2018).
207. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Seattle Launches Digital Privacy Initiative (Nov.
3,
2014),
http://murray.seattle.gov/city-of-seattle-launches-digital-privacy-initiative/
[https://perma.cc/3LU9-S3TN]; see also Seattle City Council Res. 31570 (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://clerk.seattle.gov/~archives/Resolutions/Resn_31570.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TG7E-CZTT]
(adopting citywide privacy principles).
208. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Seattle Launches Digital Privacy Initiative, supra
note 207; see also Angelique Carson, Seattle Launches Sweeping, Ethics-Based Privacy Overhaul,
PRIVACY ADVISOR (Nov. 7, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/seattle-launches-citywide-privacyinitiative/ [https://perma.cc/H2FM-V6XY] (lauding the Seattle privacy initiative as one of the most
progressive in the country).
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practices, and determine how to assess compliance.209 They were assisted
by a Privacy Advisory Committee comprised of privacy researchers,
practitioners, and community representatives, including privacy experts
from the University of Washington and Microsoft.210
In 2015, the City released Privacy Principles governing its data
collection and use practices.211 This set of six principles provides an
ethical framework for developing appropriate policies, standards, and
practices regarding the public’s personal information. They offer a local
take on the FIPs and include (1) a statement valuing privacy;
(2) collection limitations; (3) use limitations; (4) accountability;
(5) disclosure limitations; and (6) accuracy.212 The City also outlined a
process for privacy reviews, consisting of a self-service assessment using
a standardized questionnaire, then a privacy threshold analysis to be
reviewed with a “Privacy Champion” appointed by each city department,
followed by a full-scale privacy impact assessment.213 Additionally, the
city allocated resources in its 2016 budget to launch an online training and
awareness program (required of anyone who interacts with the public’s
personal data), hire a full-time Chief Privacy Officer,214 and adopt a
citywide privacy statement that provides direction to all city departments
about their obligations to follow the new principles, the privacy statement,
and privacy review process.215
The Program’s privacy policy specifically excludes surveillance
technologies, as the city’s surveillance ordinance already covers them. 216
209. Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Seattle Launches Digital Privacy Initiative, supra
note 207.
210. Privacy Advisory Committee, CITY OF SEATTLE, https://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/
privacy/privacy-advisory-committee [https://perma.cc/3JEW-SEBV].
211. Seattle City Council Res. 31570, supra note 207. The City of Seattle (along with the
University of Washington) also joined a national network of university-city partnerships to work on
“smart city” solutions, which was part of a Smart Cities Initiative under the Obama White House. See
Smart Cities – Seattle, SMART CITIES LIBRARY, https://www.smartcitieslibrary.com/smart-citiesseattle/ [https://perma.cc/4CK9-FQDL].
212. DEP’T OF INFO. TECH., CITY OF SEATTLE, CITY OF SEATTLE PRIVACY PROGRAM 7 (2015)
[hereinafter
PRIVACY
PROGRAM
BROCHURE],
http://ctab.seattle.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/COS-Privacy-Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6N6-KBB5].
213. Id. at 8.
214. In May 2016, the city appointed its first Chief Privacy Officer, who has since been replaced.
See Press Release, Seattle Information Technology, City of Seattle Hires Ginger Armbruster as Chief
Privacy Officer (July 11, 2017) http://techtalk.seattle.gov/2017/07/11/city-of-seattle-hires-gingerarmbruster-as-chief-privacy-officer/ [https://perma.cc/RR3S-YGZD].
215. To date, Seattle has published nine PIAs. Its first PIA assesses a smart metering pilot project
referred to as the Seattle City Light Advanced Metering Initiative (AMI). See infra text accompanying
notes 362–67.
216. PRIVACY PROGRAM BROCHURE, supra note 212, at 35 (stating that data not falling under the
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However, a year after announcing the Privacy Principles, the city began
consolidating all information technology (IT) employees and tasks into a
new IT department, with the goal of “establish[ing] consistent standards
and priorities for IT investments” and protecting city resources against
threats, “especially related to security and privacy risks.”217 This
consolidation covers the IT activities of the SPD as well as civilian
departments.218 Thus, it would appear that all technologies acquired or
used by the SPD are covered either by the revised surveillance ordinance
or the city’s Privacy Program.
The Open Data Program—Beginning in 2010 with its Open Data
Program and data.seattle.gov portal, Seattle has led the nation in its
embrace of public data sharing and open access datasets.219 Former Mayor
Murray expanded the program to all city agencies and departments in
February 2016 when he announced a citywide Open Data Policy that
makes all city data “open by preference”—meaning that the city favors
making city data sets publicly available while reserving the right to
withhold data if doing so would avoid harm to residents.220 The 2016
executive order set limits on this default preference by making
accessibility contingent on “screening for privacy and security
considerations.”221 A year later, the city issued an Open Data Plan. One of
the top five priorities in the plan was to complete a privacy risk assessment
in partnership with the Future of Privacy Forum.222
The Future of Privacy Forum report speaks glowingly of Seattle’s
commitment to balancing privacy and transparency, while offering some
recommendations for improvement.223 Specifically, the report found that
Seattle took seriously the risks of re-identification, data quality and
accuracy, and bias, and that the city had “largely demonstrated that its

Program’s protections included “[d]ata collection or use of technologies governed by the City’s
Surveillance Ordinance (SMC 14.18)”).
217. IT Consolidation, CITY OF SEATTLE, https://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/it-consolidation
[https://perma.cc/M55W-A7SH].
218. See Colin Wood, Seattle Begins Three-Year IT Consolidation, GOV’T TECH. (Nov. 30, 2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20170824232241/http://www.govtech.com/Seattle-Begins-Three-YearIT-Consolidation.html [https://perma.cc/D5BD-G8B4].
219. Seattle Mayor Exec. Order 2016-01 (Feb. 27, 2016), http://murray.seattle.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/2.26-EO.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VZQ-PQLE].
220. Id.
221. Id.; see also FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, CITY OF SEATTLE OPEN DATA RISK ASSESSMENT:
JANUARY 2018 FINAL REPORT 6 (Jan. 2018) [hereinafter FPF SEATTLE OPEN DATA RISK
ASSESSMENT].
222. SEATTLE INFO. TECH., CITY OF SEATTLE: 2017 OPEN DATA PLAN 8 (2017).
223. FPF SEATTLE OPEN DATA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 221.
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procedures and processes to address privacy risks are fully documented
and implemented.”224 While the report also suggested that Seattle could
do more to formalize risk assessment of data sets and engage with privacy
concerns during the data collection phase, the report concluded the City’s
Open Data Policy was “thoughtful and thorough” in its approach to
protecting individual privacy and provided “a solid foundation for
growth.”225
B.

New York City

New York City is the wealthy, thriving financial and cultural capital of
the United States, if not the world. It is America’s most populous city with
an estimated 2017 population of over 8.6 million people.226 Like Seattle,
New York City has a lower crime rate than similarly-sized cities.227
Indeed, the city now enjoys historically low crime rates.228 In stark
contrast with Seattle, where no major terrorist incidents have occurred,
however, the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City’s World
Trade Center (WTC) by the Islamist terrorist group al-Qaeda killed 2,753
people (including more than 400 first responders), injured thousands
more, and caused an estimated $60 billion in damage to the WTC site,
surrounding buildings, infrastructure, and subway facilities.229 The attacks
changed many things in the city, including how the NYPD understood its
mission.230 Following 9/11, then Police Commissioner Raymond A. Kelly
quickly shifted NYPD resources from crime-fighting to counterterrorism.231 He established the first local Counter-Terrorism Bureau and
expanded the existing Intelligence Bureau; he also recruited a Marine
Corps general to run the former and a senior Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) official to take charge of the latter,232 and created a controversial
224. Id. at 4.
225. Id. at 23–26. For a case study of open data in Seattle, see Whittington et al., supra note 23.
226. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES, supra note 121.
227. Jen Kirby, New York City Had a Record-Low Crime Rate in 2016—But That’s Not the Story
in
Other
Cities,
N.Y.
MAG:
DAILY
INTELLIGENCER
(Jan.
4,
2017),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/01/new-york-city-had-record-low-crime-rate-in2016.html [https://perma.cc/MJ8Z-L6UY].
228. Ashley Southall, Crime in New York City Plunges to a Level Not Seen Since the 1950s, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/27/nyregion/new-york-city-crime2017.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
229. 9/11: Fast Facts About September 11, CNN (Sept. 11, 2015, 1:56 PM),
https://cw33.com/2015/09/11/911-fast-facts-about-september-11/ [https://perma.cc/3EY6-Z3XS].
230. KELLY, supra note 53, at 176.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 166, 171.
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Demographics Unit, which was disbanded after being accused of spying
on Muslim communities.233 In his book, Vigilance, Kelly argues that these
and related decisions helped to avert sixteen “active terror plots” during
the almost twelve years of his second term as police commissioner.234
In New York City, the mayor appoints the chief of police, who serves
at the mayor’s pleasure.235 The NYPD is the largest police force in the
country, with over 36,000 sworn officers (about forty-two officers per
10,000 residents) and a 2016 budget of over $5 billion236 out of a total city
budget in 2016 of more than $80 billion.237 Like Seattle, New York City
is very liberal238; the state is less so.239 Elected officials in New York City
are partisan, and sometimes fiercely so, even between different factions
of the same party. Although the present mayor, Bill de Blasio, is the first
Democratic mayor since 1993,240 he and Democratic Governor Andrew
Cuomo do not always see eye to eye.241
The NYPD has a checkered history with respect to both political
surveillance and biased policing. In 1981, the city settled a decade-long
class action filed by members of various peace and black activist
organizations alleging police infiltration of their groups and intimidation
of, and spying on, their members.242 The settlement decree outlined a
233. See Matt Apuzzo & Joseph Goldstein, New York Drops Unit That Spied on Muslims, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/police-unit-that-spied-onmuslims-is-disbanded.html [https://perma.cc/2ZKQ-ZEPL].
234. KELLY, supra note 53, at 208–56 (discussing his 2002–2013 term).
235. N.Y. CITY CHARTER, § 431(a) (2018).
236. N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, REPORT ON THE FISCAL 2017 EXECUTIVE BUDGET: NEW YORK POLICE
DEP’T
1–2
(May
23,
2016),
http://council.nyc.gov/budget/wpcontent/uploads/sites/54/2016/06/nypd.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q8D-5VEJ].
237. Press Release, City of New York, Mayor de Blasio Releases FY 2017 Executive Budget (Apr.
26, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/396-16/fact-sheet-mayor-de-blasioreleases-fy-2017-executive-budget#/0 [https://perma.cc/TE29-QY7D].
238. Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 127, at 609 fig.1 (identifying N.Y.C. as the eighth most
liberal city in the country).
239. See N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, NYSVOTER ENROLLMENT BY COUNTY, PARTY
AFFILIATION
AND
STATUS
(Apr.
1,
2016),
https://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/county_apr16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PBK6-UE6W].
240. Michael Barbaro & David W. Chen, De Blasio Is Elected New York City Mayor in Landslide,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/nyregion/de-blasio-is-elected-newyork-city-mayor.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
241. Elizabeth Mitchell, Cuomo vs. de Blasio: How a Friendly, Airtight Relationship Between the
Democratic Heavyweights Turned Ugly. Is It Beyond Repair?, DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2016),
http://interactive.nydailynews.com/2016/10/inside-the-cuomo-deblasio-feud/index.html (last visited
Oct. 27, 2018).
242. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1417 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 787 F.2d
828 (2d Cir. 1986).
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series of intelligence reforms known as the Handschu Guidelines, which
imposed restrictions on political investigations and provided for civilian
oversight of the NYPD’s compliance. The settlement also created the
Handschu Authority, a panel consisting of one civilian and two deputy
commissioners, whose approval was required for investigations longer
than thirty days.243
In 2003, the Southern District of New York agreed to modify the
guidelines in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.244 The 2003 Modified
Handschu Guidelines, among other things, abolished the Authority’s
approval role and reduced its function to public complaint investigations
and record reviews.245 But this did not end the long-running controversy
over NYPD spying on political (and religious) activity. In 2011, the
Associated Press ran a series of articles demonstrating extensive NYPD
surveillance and attempted infiltration of local Muslim communities and
mosques,246 which resulted in a new lawsuit and still further revisions to
the modified guidelines.247
Nor have NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practices fared well in the courts. In
2013, a federal judge found the practices unconstitutional, concluding that
they violated New Yorkers’ rights to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures and that the practices were racially discriminatory.248 To
remedy these violations, Judge Shira Scheindlin ordered a courtappointed monitor to oversee a series of reforms to NYPD policing
practices and also created a mechanism for soliciting input from a variety
of stakeholders, including the minority communities most directly
affected by these practices. More recently, the court approved a pilot
program that would outfit 1,200 police officers with body-worn
cameras.249

243. Id. at 1420–24.
244. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
245. Id. at 350 (detailing modified guidelines approved by the court).
246. For a list of relevant references, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 377 n.4, 378 n.8.
247. David Kimball-Stanley, Settling for More: The NYPD’s New Oversight Deal, LAWFARE (Mar.
8, 2017, 11:49 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/settling-more-nypds-new-oversight-deal
[https://perma.cc/3E6Z-NRH6].
248. Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judgerules.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
249. Ashley Southall, Judge Clears Way for Police Body Cameras in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
21,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/nyregion/judge-police-body-cameras-newyork.html?_r=0 (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). For a discussion of the NYPD’s body camera policy, see
infra text accompanying note 279–304.
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Finally, there have been dozens of NYPD incidents involving excessive
use of force, including the July 2014 death of Eric Garner after a NYPD
officer put him in a chokehold, an incident that was captured on a cell
phone video showing Garner yelling “I can’t breathe.”250 Three weeks
later, a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri shot an unarmed black
teenager named Michael Brown, leading to nationwide protests and the
birth of the Black Lives Matter movement.251
1.

New York City’s Public Security Privacy Guidelines and Proposed
Surveillance Ordinance

The DAS Guidelines—One of the steps Commissioner Kelly took to
help protect New Yorkers against future terrorist attacks was creation of
the DAS (Domain Awareness System), described above. The New York
City Charter grants the NYPD plenary power to preserve order and
enforce criminal law. The NYPD created the DAS by exercising that
power, without need for any additional authority or direction by the city
council.252 However, the team responsible for developing and
implementing the DAS anticipated that wide-scale police surveillance of
public spaces would raise significant privacy concerns.253 Accordingly,
they released draft privacy guidelines for a thirty-day comment period in
2009,254 and later that spring, published revised guidelines in final form.255
The DAS guidelines established policies and procedures serving two
main goals: “to limit the authorized use of the Domain Awareness System
and to provide for limited access to and proper disposition of stored
data.”256 In keeping with the former, the guidelines prohibit targeting or

250. Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June
13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-statenisland.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
251. Josh Hafner, How Michael Brown’s Death, Two Years Ago, Pushed #BlackLivesMatter into
a Movement, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2016, 7:50 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2016/08/08/how-michael-browns-death-two-years-ago-pushed-blacklivesmatter-intomovement/88424366/ [https://perma.cc/224Q-FAZA].
252. N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 435(a) (2018).
253. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, PUBLIC SECURITY PRIVACY GUIDELINES (2009) [hereinafter NYPD
PRIVACY
GUIDELINES],
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/
public_security_privacy_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VDT-FNMX].
254. N.Y. Police Dep’t, Press Release, New York City Police Department Releases a Draft of the
Public Security Privacy Guidelines
for Public Comment (Feb. 25, 2009),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/PressReleaseDraftPublicSecurityPrivacyGuidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/mpr9-xjsl].
255. NYPD PRIVACY GUIDELINES, supra note 253.
256. Id. at 1.
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monitoring by the DAS solely based on actual or perceived membership
in protected categories, which are very broadly defined.257 Additionally,
while the DAS may be used to monitor public areas and activities “where
no legally protected reasonable expectation of privacy exists,” this must
be limited to certain enumerated counter-terrorism purposes258; secondary
uses beyond counterterrorism purposes and data sharing with a third-party
require approval by a high ranking official.259
The DAS guidelines also adopt safeguards protecting the security of all
sensitive data; limiting database access to authorized personnel who have
received privacy training and signed a confidentiality agreement; and
requiring the creation of an immutable data logs, which are subject to
periodic compliance reviews by a NYPD integrity control officer.260
Finally, data gathered via the DAS is typically destroyed at the end of an
(unspecified) retention period for “routine review” unless further retention
is approved (under unspecified criteria), and retention periods are
established for different classes of data.261
The NYPD developed the DAS guidelines voluntarily using an
informal version of notice-and-comment rulemaking.262 This
“rulemaking” procedure is hard to assess because there is no public record
of the number of comments submitted, their content, or the NYPD’s
response. However, the comments of the Constitution Project are publicly
available and give some idea of how civil libertarians viewed the DAS
guidelines.263
The DAS guidelines take some important steps toward protecting
privacy rights and civil liberties. While the NYPD deserves credit for
developing the guidelines and even requesting comments, its informal
approach to rulemaking only partially satisfies the City Administrative
Procedure Act, which requires an agency proposing a rule to notify the
public of the proposed rule, hold a public hearing to provide an
257. Id. at 3.
258. Id. at 2–3.
259. Id. at 4.
260. Id. at 6–7.
261. For example, the current retention periods are thirty days for video, five years for metadata
related to the DAS, and five years for ALPR data. Id. at 2–4.
262. NYPD, Press Release, New York City Police Department Releases a Draft of the Public
Security Privacy Guidelines for Public Comment, supra note 254.
263. See Sharon Bradford Franklin, CONSTITUTION PROJECT, Comments of the Constitution
Project Regarding the New York City Police Department’s Proposed Public Security Privacy
Guidelines for the Domain Awareness System (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/137.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE26-SGR3] (suggesting needed improvements
related to retention, access and auditing).

14 - Rubinstein (3).docx (Do Not Delete)

2004

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

1/6/2019 12:43 PM

[Vol. 93:1961

opportunity for public comment, review testimony including any written
comments, and modify the rule, if necessary, before issuing a final rule.264
Furthermore, the DAS guidelines are quite weak in two key areas beyond
the concerns raised above. First, the guidelines fail to specify the criteria
for approving data sharing with third-parties. Specifically, they do not
address data-sharing arrangements with federal agencies such as DHS,
which awarded New York a $25 million grant to help pay for the DAS
and may have sought access to data in return.265 Second, the guidelines
provide for very limited oversight. They require periodic reviews of audit
logs to ensure compliance with the stated rules, but NYPD
counterterrorism officials conduct these reviews, which do not appear to
be shared with the city council, the mayor’s office, the general public, or
with any externally-appointed oversight commission.266 Enhanced
transparency and oversight seem all the more necessary in light of the fact
that the rules do not create any private right of action and lack other
enforcement mechanisms.
The POST Act—On March 1, 2017, the New York City Council
introduced a bill requiring the NYPD to disclose information about the
high-tech surveillance tools it deploys for counterterrorism and law
enforcement purposes.267 The bill, called the Public Oversight of Police
Technology (POST) Act, requires the reporting and evaluation of
surveillance technologies used by the NYPD and broadly defines such
technologies as any “equipment, software, or system capable of, or used
or designed for, collecting, retaining, processing, or sharing audio, video,
location, thermal, biometric, or similar information, that is operated by or
at the direction of the department.”268 More specifically, the POST Act

264. See Rulemaking Process 101, N.Y.C., http://rules.cityofnewyork.us/content/rulemakingprocess-101 [https://perma.cc/4EP4-6HLM].
265. In October 2007, the New York Civil Liberties Union submitted a Freedom of Information
Law (FOIL) request for documents relating to New York City’s plan to implement an earlier version
of the DAS. The request included documents transmitted between the NYPD and DHS including,
among other things, “the extent to which the information will be shared with other law enforcement
agencies or other entities.” N.Y. Civil Liberties v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2542,
at *3 (Sup. Ct. Jun. 26, 2009). The NYPD denied the FOIL request, and the denial was upheld despite
a legal challenge. Id. at *9, *13–14.
266. N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, PRIVACY GUIDELINES, supra note 253, at 7.
267. Erin Durkin, NYC Lawmaker Pushes Bill to Make NYPD Unveil All High-Tech Surveillance
Tools Used, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/polpushes-bill-nypd-unveil-high-tech-surveillance-tools-article-1.2985193
[https://perma.cc/8TH23EP7].
268. Public Oversight of Surveillance Technology Act, N.Y.C. Council, Int. No. 1482 (as
introduced
Mar.
1,
2017)
[hereinafter
POST
Act],
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2972217&GUID=0D8289B8-5F08-
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requires the NYPD to issue a surveillance impact and use policy (the “SIU
Policy”), which must describe the capabilities of covered surveillance
technologies.269 It also requires the NYPD to adopt policies relating to the
retention, access, and use of data collected by such technology and any
data sharing with local, state, federal, or private entities; safeguards and
security measures designed to protect the information collected; internal
audit and oversight mechanisms; and health and safety effects.270 Upon
publication of the draft SIU Policy, the Act requires a public comment
period and consideration of these comments by the police commissioner,
who then provides the final version of the policy to the city council, the
mayor, and the public.271 Finally, the bill requires the inspector general
for the NYPD to audit the SIU Policy to ensure compliance with its terms
and to recommend any revisions of the policy.272
Unlike the surveillance ordinances adopted in Seattle and other cities,
the POST Act is not the product of any public outcry over newly-installed
surveillance systems. Rather, the NYPD developed the DAS guidelines to
head off privacy concerns, so the POST Act may reflect some
combination of its sponsors’ political ambitions and their reluctance to tie
the hands of a police department that foiled numerous terrorist attacks in
the years following 9/11.273
Clearly, the POST Act improves upon the DAS guidelines by imposing
comprehensive reporting and oversight of all NYPD use of surveillance
technologies. But this proposed local law is much weaker than its Seattle
counterpart. It requires the NYPD Commissioner to prepare the SIU
Policy after public comment and provide it to the city council and mayor,
but does not require approval prior to any use of the technology in
question.274 While the POST Act forces the NYPD to become more
transparent, it dispenses with enforcement mechanisms or penalties for
non-compliance. Unlike the SPD, which did not oppose the Seattle
ordinance, the NYPD condemned the POST Act on the grounds that its
detailed descriptions of surveillance technologies would aid terrorists and
criminals by disclosing “all sorts of confidential information about how
these lawful surveillance techniques work.”275 The Bill’s sponsors and
4E6F-A0D1-2120EF7A0DCA (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
269. Id. § 1.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. § 2.
273. KELLY, supra note 53, at 208–56.
274. POST Act, supra note 268, § 2.
275. Ben Kochman & Erin Durkin, NYPD Officials Argue ‘Very Bad’ City Council Bill Would Aid
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supporters rejected this criticism as wildly overblown, noting that “[t]he
NYPD always resists transparency measures” and that it is unhelpful to
mischaracterize the Bill as requiring the NYPD to disclose “operational
details” on its technology.276 As the Brennan Center pointed out, “the
federal government routinely discloses its ground rules for using new
technologies and strongly encourage[s] local agencies to be open to the
public about the surveillance technologies they use.”277 The POST Act did
not pass in 2017 but the Council introduced an identical bill early in 2018,
which is still pending.278
The Body Camera Policy—In New York City, the police department
was under somewhat fewer constraints than the SPD in establishing its
own body-worn camera program. To begin with, New York is a “oneparty” state and thereby avoids all party consent issues, so there is no need
to obtain consent from other parties to a communication.279 Additionally,
the state public disclosure law does not require the NYPD to engage in
massive release of police video footage.280 Although the city council
introduced a bill and held hearings in 2014 to create a task force to study
disclosure issues, the bill did not advance.281
In 2014, prior to launching this mandatory pilot project, the NYPD
conducted a small pre-pilot program in which fifty-four patrol officers
volunteered to wear body cameras. Its purpose was to test body camera
equipment, enhance NYPD’s understanding of the information
Terrorists in Working Around High-Tech Surveillance Tools, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 1, 2017),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-officials-bill-terrorists-dodge-surveillance-article1.2986286 [https://perma.cc/U4JX-VBQE].
276. Id.
277. Michael Price, New York City Is Making Its Citizens Safer by Overseeing Police Technology,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/new-york-citymaking-its-citizens-safer-overseeing-police-technology [https://perma.cc/WR5M-EF7M] (noting
that DOJ and DHS have published policies on their use of “Stingrays” and that DHS has also been
open about its use of facial recognition technologies and ALPRs); see also Written Testimony of
Michael Price, Counsel for the Brennan Center for Justice, Hearing before the N.Y.C. Council Comm.
on Pub. Safety (June 14, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/BrennanCenter-Testimony-to-NYC-Council-on-Int-1482.pdf [https://perma.cc/L59H-AHXV].
278. N.Y.C.
Council,
Int.
No.
487
(as
introduced
Feb.
14,
2018),
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3343878&GUID=996ABB2A-9F4C4A32-B081-D6F24AB954A0&Options=ID|Text|&Search=487 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018)
279. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 250.00-.05.
280. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, NYPD RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND OFFICER INPUT ON THE
DEPARTMENT’S
PROPOSED
BODY-WORN
CAMERA
POLICY
24–26
(2017),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/body-worn-camera-policyresponse.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5AD-HNKW].
281. N.Y.C. Council, Int. No. 607 (2014), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?
ID=2103584&GUID=632A9A91-7FD5-424A-880D-7A4E0A8AD0B2 [last visited Nov. 21, 2018].
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technology infrastructure necessary to support it, and gain insight on
matters of policy and practical implementation.282 The NYPD then issued
Operations Order 48, which unilaterally set the rules for officers
participating in this small pre-pilot.283 In July 2015, the Inspector General
for the New York City Police Department (OIG-NYPD), a unit of the
Department of Investigation that operates independently of the NYPD,
published an initial assessment of the pre-pilot and recommended several
changes to the program prior to citywide implementation.284
This activity occurred in the shadow of Floyd v. City of New York,285 a
landmark federal class action lawsuit addressing the NYPD’s
controversial stop-and-frisk policies.286 The federal court and the
appointed monitor overseeing the stop-and-frisk settlement played a
significant role in supervising the body-worn camera pilot project.287 After
the pre-pilot ended, and in preparation for distributing body-worn cameras
more broadly as required by Floyd, the NYPD met with a broad range of
stakeholders to obtain feedback; then revised its body-worn camera
policy, sharing the proposed revisions with the police unions.288 The
Department also sought the assistance of the Policing Project at New York
University (NYU) School of Law and the NYU Marron Institute to solicit
public input on the draft policy from both members of the public and
police officers, respectively.289 At the close of the comment period, more
282. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS ORDER 48, PILOT PROGRAM-USE OF BODY-WORN
CAMERAS (2014).
283. Id.; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE NYPD, BODY-WORN CAMERAS IN
NYC: AN ASSESSMENT OF NYPD’S PILOT PROGRAM AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO PROMOTE
ACCOUNTABILITY 45–52 (2015) [hereinafter OIG-NYPD, BODY-WORN CAMERAS],
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/oignypd/downloads/pdf/nypd-body-camera-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RW9F-TYVD].
284. See OIG-NYPD, BODY-WORN CAMERAS, supra note 283, at 9–36.
285. 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
286. See generally id. For other examples of stop-and-frisk class actions, see Ligon v. City of New
York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), and Davis v. City of New York, 296 F.R.D. 158
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
287. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 676.
288. See Peter Zimroth, Memorandum Regarding Approval of Policies for NYPD Body-Worn
Camera
Pilot
Program
at
5–7
(Apr.
11,
2017),
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2017/04/Monitor%204%2011%202017%20Memo%2
0to%20Court%20re%20Approval%20of%20BWC%20Op%20Order..pdf [https://perma.cc/SY4RTU7B].
289. Id. at 6; see also POLICING PROJECT, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, REPORT TO THE NYPD
SUMMARIZING PUBLIC FEEDBACK ON ITS PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY (2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/59ce7edfb0786914ba448d82/1
506705121578/Report+to+the+NYPD+Summarizing+Public+Feedback+on+BWC+Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7PG-SB4K]; JONATHAN STEWART, NYU MARRON INST. OF URBAN MGMT.,
REPORT ON THE NYPD OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERA QUESTIONNAIRE (Feb. 21, 2017),
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than 25,000 members of the public and more than 5,400 uniformed
officers had participated.290
The Department then made several changes to its proposed policy
based on the feedback received through the comment process.291 These
included requiring rather than merely encouraging notice to individuals
being recorded; adding “inventory searches” and “public interactions that
escalate and become adversarial” to the list of events where recording is
required; providing additional direction regarding the circumstances when
an officer may view a recording related to a serious use of force or an
allegation of misconduct; increasing the retention period from six months
to one year; and requiring periodic inspections/audits to ensure
compliance with the Department’s procedures in the use of cameras and
the resulting footage.292 However, the NYPD did not accept the public’s
recommendations that more police interactions should be recorded, that
officers should not be able to view body camera footage before writing a
report on a use-of-force incident, and that body camera footage should be
more readily accessible.293
NYPD body camera footage is a public record and thus subject to New
York’s freedom of information law (FOIL). 294 In comparison with
Washington state’s PRA, FOIL takes a more expansive view of when an
unwarranted invasion of privacy exempts a public record from
disclosure.295 For example, when a TV station recently requested the
release of NYPD body camera footage, the court delayed approval
pending a hearing to determine whether reviewing and redacting the
videos would be unduly burdensome.296 In addition, civil rights and police
reform advocates have expressed concerns about whether the NYPD
https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/uploads/content/NYPD_Officer_BWC_Questionnaire_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GR8M-T7YM].
290. Zimroth, supra note 288, at 7.
291. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 280, at 4–25. The revised draft policy is available at N.Y.
POLICE DEP’T, DRAFT OPERATIONS ORDER: PILOT PROGRAM—USE OF BODY-WORN CAMERAS
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/investigations_pdf/oo_16_17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QXB-CVWN].
292. N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, NYPD RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND OFFICER INPUT ON THE
DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY, supra note 280, at 1.
293. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Pulling the Public into Police Accountability,
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/6869-pulling-thepublic-into-police-accountability [https://perma.cc/ZBC7-U95C] (commending the NYPD, however,
for the process it followed in obtaining public input).
294. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84–90 (McKinney 2018).
295. See id. § 87(2)(b).
296. See Time Warner Cable News NY1 v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 53 Misc. 3d 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2016).
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might alternatively rely on New York State’s Civil Rights Law section
50-a297 to block requests from news reporters or advocacy groups for the
release of body-worn camera footage under FOIL.298 This provision treats
as confidential any personnel records of police officers used to evaluate
performance toward continued employment and promotion.299 In short,
the NYPD is less exposed to massive requests for body camera footage
than the SPD—and it knows it.300
In April 2017, the monitor in Floyd approved the revised policy as to
those areas within the monitor’s purview and without requiring any
further changes.301 Ten days later, the Floyd court approved the
deployment of body-worn cameras to 1,200 officers.302 This happened
despite objections from the plaintiffs, who argued that the revised policy
was likely to increase public surveillance, especially in the black and
Latino communities that were harmed by racial profiling and aggressive
stop-and-frisk tactics.303 Going forward, the Department will determine
whether the cameras made a difference to officer performance, civilian
complaints, crime levels and prosecutions, and then decide whether to
continue expanding the program.304

297. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (2018).
298. See generally Meenakshi Krishnan, New York’s Section 50-a Shields Law Enforcement
Records, YALE L. SCH. MEDIA FREEDOM & INFO. ACCESS CLINIC (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://law.yale.edu/mfia/case-disclosed/new-yorks-section-50-shields-law-enforcement-records
[https://perma.cc/J2YX-7R7H].
299. See Molloy v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 50 A.D.3d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding FOIL
requests related to an investigation by the police would likely be exempt from disclosure under N.Y.
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a).
300. See N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, NYPD RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND OFFICER INPUT ON THE
DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY, supra note 280, at 24 (stating—in
obvious reference to Seattle’s experiment with a YouTube channel—that FOIL “offers a process with
privacy controls that, in our view, is far superior to the live-streaming of NYPD policing online, as
some departments have tried to do with sometimes extremely harmful consequences”).
301. See Southall, Judge Clears Way for Police Body Worn Cameras in New York, supra note 249.
302. Id.
303. See Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, Attorneys Challenge NYPD Body
Camera Policy, Asks Judge to Order Changes (Apr. 25, 2017), https://ccrjustice.org/home/presscenter/press-releases/attorneys-challenge-nypd-body-camera-policy-ask-judge-order-changes
[https://perma.cc/RCQ7-3D85].
304. Ashley Southall, Do Body Cameras Help Policing? 1,200 New York Officers Aim to Find Out,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/nyregion/do-body-cameras-helppolicing-1200-new-york-officers-aim-to-find-out.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
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New York City Privacy Principles

Until very recently, New York City did not undertake a privacy
initiative of comparable breadth and depth to that of Seattle. In 2016, the
Mayor’s Office of Technology and Innovation announced a narrow set of
guiding principles for smart cities that were limited in scope to the use of
sensor technologies and other IoT deployments.305 Although the privacy
and transparency principles match up reasonably well with the FIPs, it is
not clear if they impose binding obligations on city agencies.306 Indeed,
the guidelines may be nothing more than recommendations, rather than
legally enforceable obligations.307 Moreover, the IoT Guidelines seem to
exempt law enforcement projects, noting that “[s]pecial circumstances
and concerns may also exist for IoT systems and/or data related to public
safety, security and law enforcement.”308
In November 2017, however, the City Council enacted its first
comprehensive privacy laws in the form of two bills designed to protect
personal information collected by city employees and contractors in the
course of providing services and benefits to local residents.309 Local
Law 245 requires every city agency to report on their data collection,
retention, and disclosure policies and current practices.310 It also
establishes a Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) and interagency committee to
review those reports and develop new, detailed protocols for protecting
identifying information in cooperation with agency privacy officers.311
305. See
NYC
Guidelines
for
the
Internet
of
Things,
N.Y.C.
(2018),
https://iot.cityofnewyork.us/privacy-and-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/RFN3-Y7G9] [hereinafter
IoT Guidelines].
306. The IoT Guidelines cross-reference several citywide polices and laws. For example, the
privacy and transparency section cross-references three polices (data classification, encryption, and
media re-use and disposal) and the NYC Open Data Law. Id. The guidelines do not refer to any
citywide privacy policies or laws. Id.
307. See
Guidelines
for
the
Internet
of
Things:
FAQ,
N.Y.C.
(2018),
https://iot.cityofnewyork.us/faq/ [https://perma.cc/5PA3-EP6G] (describing the IoT Guidelines as
supplemental and noting that “[c]ity agencies are responsible for implementing and enforcing the
guidelines when deploying and managing IoT projects”).
308. Id.
309. Prior to their enactment, the city had several laws and policies in place imposing mandatory
security standards relating to personal information and creating the position of Chief Information
Security Officer, but no privacy laws as such. For a description of these policies, see generally
Cybersecurity
Requirements
for
Vendors
&
Contractors,
N.Y.C.
(2018),
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doitt/business/it-security-requirements-vendors-contractors.page
[https://perma.cc/X736-APXD].
310. N.Y.C. Council, Local Law 245, Int. No. 1557-A (2017) (codified at N.Y.C. CHARTER § 8
and N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 23-1203, 23-1204, 23-1205 (2018)).
311. Id.

14 - Rubinstein (3).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

1/6/2019 12:43 PM

PRIVACY LOCALISM

2011

Local Law 247312 requires city employees and contractors to protect all
identifying information by limiting collection, disclosure, and retention,
except where required by law.313 Requests for the collection or disclosure
of identifying information are processed by a newly established privacy
officer within each agency who analyzes whether the collection or
disclosure furthers the purpose or mission of the agency.
These new laws, which took effect in June 2018, are best understood
through the lens of several citywide initiatives and programs that preceded
and shaped them. For example, in 2008, the mayor’s office launched an
initiative known as HHS-Connect to provide “a more complete
understanding of clients’ needs and enable more efficient and effective
service delivery.”314 HHS-Connect achieves this goal through data
integration and exchange among multiple health and human services
agencies. Participating agencies sign an “Inter-Agency Data Exchange
Agreement” that, among other things, ensures the protection and
confidentiality of all data exchanged or accessed by HHS-Connect
systems.315 A few years later, the city enacted the Open Data Law,
mandating that by the end of 2018, the city make all “public” data sets
freely available on a single web portal (i.e., any comprehensive collection
of data that is maintained on a computer system by or on behalf of a city
agency).316 This law does not explicitly address data protection issues.
Thereafter, the mayor issued an executive order creating the Mayor’s
Office of Data Analytics (MODA). MODA’s responsibilities include
collaborative, data-driven solutions, a citywide data platform, oversight
for data projects, and implementation of the Open Data Law.317 MODA
also uses “analytics tools to prioritize risk more strategically, deliver
services more efficiently, enforce laws more effectively and increase
transparency,” and has undertaken several initiatives—none of which
emphasize maintaining privacy.318
312. N.Y.C. Council, Local Law 247, Int. No. 1588-A (Dec. 17, 2017) (codified at N.Y.C. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 23-1201, 23-1202).
313. Id.
314. N.Y.C.
Mayor
Exec.
Order
No.
114
(Mar.
18,
2008),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/eo/eo_114.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KES-F39G].
315. Inter-Agency Data Exchange Agreement, Agencies of the City of N.Y. (Nov. 2010),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/interagencymous/mou_between_hpd_and_city_agencies_for_hhs_connect.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDQ6-PSEF].
316. N.Y.C. Council, Local Law 11, Int. No. 29-A (Mar. 7, 2012) (codified at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE
§ 23-501 et seq.).
317. N.Y.C.
Mayor
Exec.
Order
No.
306
(Apr.
17,
2013),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/eo/eo_306.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJF5-KSWA].
318. About
the
Office
of
Data
Analytics,
N.Y.C.
(2018),
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In 2015, the City Council held hearings on a proposed local law that
would have required each city agency that collects personal information
to develop a system to protect the privacy of that information. Agencies
would have to adopt appropriate administrative, technical and physical
safeguards to ensure the confidentiality of personal records and destroy
those records once the purpose of collecting that information was
achieved.319 The bill did not advance, mainly because the mayor’s office
objected, stating that the bill would “inadvertently impede the delivery of
critically needed services to New Yorkers . . . through legally authorized
inter-agency data exchanges that are facilitated through technology.”320
The new privacy laws enacted in 2017 overcome this objection by
balancing the privacy interests of those who rely on human services
against the City’s strong commitment to deliver these services in an
efficient and effective manner.
Thus, the new laws set policies restricting the collection and disclosure
of identifying information but also contain provisions facilitating data
sharing in routine circumstances or where it serves the best interests of the
City.321 City agencies also must require contractors and subcontractors
that obtain identifying information to apply these collection, disclosure,
and retention requirements.322 Another important goal of the new laws is
to address any privacy concerns that might deter residents from seeking
city services by defining “identifying information” in very broad terms.323
Most definitions of personal information refer mainly to specific
identifiers that may be used (individually or in combination) to identify or
locate an individual (e.g., name, address, contact information, license
plate numbers, and biometrics). In contrast, the term “identifying
information” refers to identifiers as well as information related to various
types of status including those enumerated in the NYCID program. 324 The
new law imposes additional requirements for protecting identifying
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/analytics/about/about-office-data-analytics.page [https://perma.cc/49LBHCJT].
319. See Personal Information Privacy, N.Y.C. Council, Int. No. 627 (as introduced Jan. 22, 2015).
320. Written Testimony of Mindy Tarlow, Director, N.Y.C. Mayor’s Office of Operations, Hearing
before
the
N.Y.C.
Council
Comm.
on
Tech.
3
(Feb.
1,
2016),
legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=4233458&GUID=87B6F563-96A0-433A-ACD8B36BC7371D67 [https://perma.cc/29VX-25BF].
321. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 23-1202(c)-(e).
322. See id. § 23-1202(g).
323. See id. § 23-1201.
324. See id. It is more common in privacy circles to refer to these status categories as “sensitive
information,” which is a special subset of PII usually subject to additional obligations. See generally
Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2015).
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information as so defined including anonymization and limitations on
how third-parties may use such information.325
The Open Data Program—In 2012, New York City followed
Seattle’s lead by amending the City’s administrative code to mandate
publication of city data online.326 The City Council has amended and
strengthened its Open Data Law several times since,327 and an Open Data
Team composed of members of MODA and the city information
technology department is working with a government technology vendor
to achieve the law’s mandates.328
In contrast to Seattle, New York City’s open data website explicitly
disclaims the completeness and accuracy of the city’s data for any
particular purpose and notes that users must agree to certain terms of use
imposed by individual agencies to access data made available on the
central portal.329 Although the City’s Open Data Program shares many of
the same goals as Seattle’s—transparency, accountability, economic
growth, and generating research insights—its publications about the
program fail to explicitly mention the privacy risks inherent in smart city
data publication activities. While both mention similar goals at various
points, only Seattle’s contains explicit descriptions of and plans to resolve
privacy concerns.330 Responsibility for privacy appears to be placed in the
hands of each individual agency rather than handled in a more centralized
manner.331 The City appears to define privacy as beyond the scope of its
Open Data program, noting that disclosure of information that “result[s]
in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” is already exempt from
public access under FOIL.332 Other than noting the “open by default”
policy stops where existing privacy law begins, New York City’s strategy

325. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 23-1203(3), (5).
326. N.Y.C. Council, Local Law 11, Int. No. 29-A (mandating open data availability by the end of
2018).
327. See
NYC
OpenData:
Laws
and
Reports,
N.Y.C.
(2017),
https://opendata.cityofnewyork.us/open-data-law/ [https://perma.cc/C7WD-KZCQ] (discussing and
citing amendments of November 2015, January 2016, and December 2017, to strengthen retention
requirements, response timelines, and make permanent the original Open Data mandate).
328. NYC OpenData: Overview, N.Y.C. (2017), https://opendata.cityofnewyork.us/overview/
[https://perma.cc/N74J-QKUY].
329. Id. (discussing Open Data Terms of Use).
330. Compare id., with SEATTLE INFO. TECH., 2017 OPEN DATA PLAN, supra note 222.
331. DEP’T OF INFO. TECH. & TELECOMM., N.Y.C., OPEN DATA POLICY AND TECHNICAL
STANDARDS MANUAL § 4.4.2 (2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doitt/downloads/pdf/
nyc_open_data_tsm.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES4S-UM3X].
332. Id. § 4.5(b).
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for privacy protection in open data initiatives appears, at present, to lack
an independent privacy apparatus.333
C.

Assessing Privacy Localism in Seattle and New York City

It is too soon to offer any serious evaluation of the ongoing experiments
with privacy localism in Seattle and New York City. To begin with, the
surveillance ordinances are brand new, or still in the proposal stage, and
the privacy program in New York City is just taking effect. In Seattle, the
privacy program is several years old but there is still not enough data to
assess its strengths and weaknesses. When sufficient data is gathered, an
important question will be whether cities have sufficient expertise and
resources to engage in privacy regulation as compared to their federal and
state counterparts. After all, cities like Seattle and New York lack the kind
of administrative infrastructure taken for granted when Congress
delegates rulemaking, programmatic design, and ongoing supervisory
duties to federal agencies. These agencies rely on institutional,
organizational, and doctrinal mechanisms to produce, review, and
approve a high volume of rules, licenses, permits, and so on. Lacking
these mechanisms, officials in Seattle and New York City may be
overwhelmed by the amount of work required to produce, review and/or
approve a high volume of privacy-related applications, assessments, and
reports.
A second issue is whether local surveillance laws risk isolating local
police departments by disrupting regional and local partnerships with
other agencies not subject to similar requirements. For example, during
the hearings on the revised surveillance ordinance, the SPD raised
concerns that extending the ordinance beyond surveillance technology to
encompass surveillance data might jeopardize data sharing arrangements
under regional partnerships for reducing gang activity and gun violence,
and even turn Seattle into a data island.334
Finally, cities may rely too heavily on legal—as opposed to
technological—instruments of privacy regulation. In their study of
privacy governance, Professors Colin Bennett and Charles Raab
distinguish legal instruments like self-regulatory principles and statutes
from technological instruments including “privacy by design,” i.e., cities

333. Id. § 3.4.1.
334. See Gender Equity, Safe Communities, & New Americans Committee, SEATTLE CHANNEL, at
1:21 to 1:22 (July 12, 2017), https://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/citycouncil/2016/2017-gender-equity-safe-communities-and-new-americans-committee/?videoid=
x78884 [https://perma.cc/L4R9-L4ZM] (statement of SPD Chief Technology Officer Brian Maxey).
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imposing design requirements on vendors or only purchasing technology
with certain privacy protective features.335 To date, Seattle and New York
City have relied almost exclusively on legal instruments to regulate
technology deployments and data collection, use, and disclosure within
their local governments and have largely done without technological
instruments.
At this point, however, a preliminary assessment of the surveillance
oversight and privacy governance programs under development in Seattle
and New York City is feasible to determine whether they achieve their
stated purposes. Section II.C thus considers to what extent privacy
localism contributes to what Barry Friedman calls “democratic policing”
and closes the two privacy gaps identified above.
1.

Policing and Democratic Governance

Much of the commentary on urban policing and related privacy issues
is a tale of competing narratives. One narrative centers on race, crime, and
the fight for social justice. Thus, it tends to focus on controversial or
abusive policing practice.336 The other is a tale of terror that focuses on
the unrelenting string of urban suicide bombings and violent assaults in
New York, Moscow, Istanbul, Mumbai, Madrid, London, Nairobi,
Boston, Brussels, Paris, and other cities.337 These attacks have caused tens
of thousands of deaths and many billions of dollars of economic losses.338
Controversial policing practices are also part of this terrorism narrative.
They range from changes in the mission of local police forces to the use
of new surveillance technologies under broad authorities that do not
require any showing of particularized suspicion, and—at least in the
United States—a new emphasis on information sharing and unified action
across multiple levels of government via fusion centers and Joint
Terrorism Task Forces.339
335. See COLIN BENNETT & CHARLES RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY 117–204 (2006).
336. See supra text accompanying note 67.
337. See Robert Muggah, Is Urban Terrorism the New Normal? Probably, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan.
17,
2016),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/is-urban-terrorism-is-the-new-normalprobably/ [https://perma.cc/WZG6-LN2B].
338. This is only a partial listing and it omits smaller but frequent attacks in multiple cities in
countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, and Pakistan; these too
wreak havoc in their own devastating way. See generally Global Terrorism Database (GTD), UNIV.
MD. (June 2017), http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2018) (listing statistics and
trends in terror attacks around the world).
339. See generally STEPHEN GRAHAM, CITIES, WAR, AND TERRORISM: TOWARDS AN URBAN
GEOPOLITICS (2004); MICHAEL PRICE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
LOCAL POLICE (2013); Muggah, supra note 337.
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In his recent work on democratic policing, Professor Friedman
advances the argument that these two narratives—racial bias in police
tactics and intelligence gathering via panvasive surveillance—are not
isolated issues but rather two sides of a single phenomenon: the complete
breakdown of democratic control over policing.340 Friedman begins by
observing that due to overbroad enabling statutes, most policing occurs
without any clear rules or policies in place; or, if they do exist, they are
not readily accessible to the public.341 Legislators do not have much
incentive to change this given the powerful special interest groups, like
police unions, that have a stake in opposing such regulation and the
political weakness of the victims of out-of-control policing, such as
minorities and the poor.342 Finally, Friedman contends that courts have
failed to properly supervise policing procedures mainly because judicial
remedies, such as the exclusionary rule and damages actions, are
ineffective.343 Moreover, judicial review is ill-equipped to deal with the
recent shift from reactive and investigative policing based on
particularized suspicion, to proactive and programmatic policing targeting
larger populations and entire neighborhoods or ethnic groups, who are
subjected to dragnet forms of surveillance.344 Friedman and Ponomarenko
sum up these governance failures as constituting a kind “police
exceptionalism” within the administrative state.345 Friedman contends that
what is urgently needed to overcome police exceptionalism is not more
oversight but rather “rules that are written before officials act, rules that
are public, rules that are written with public participation.”346 In short, the
democratic polity must insist on “transparent democratic processes such
as legislative authorization and public rulemaking”347 as applied to
policing.
Is democratic policing an achievable goal? Friedman is undoubtedly
correct in suggesting that recent events have forced police to do a better
job of soliciting public input. In the wake of multiple police killings of
African-Americans in cities across the country, police chiefs have started
to listen to local citizens about a range of policy issues. It is more common
340. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 6–14; see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119.
341. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1844.
342. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 101–03.
343. Id. at 81–86.
344. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1871–75; see also Renan, supra note 68;
Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 68.
345. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1837.
346. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 20.
347. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1832.
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than ever before for local police forces to hear from a variety of
stakeholders (civil liberties groups and privacy advocates as well as local
residents) before formulating policies on the use of surplus military
equipment,348 drones,349 and body-worn cameras.350
That said, democratic policing will not be easily achieved. Difficult
questions will need to be addressed about how to scale public rulemaking
to communities and police forces of various sizes. After all, there are more
than 13,000 U.S. police departments serving both large cities and smaller
communities—with more than half of these departments serving
communities with fewer than 10,000 residents—and there is a high degree
of variance in police department size.351 For example, the median local
police department has only eight full-time officers, while the NYPD has
36,000. The availability of model rules from various sources should help
ease the burden of smaller communities having to draft rules from the
ground up.352 Lastly, Friedman and Ponomarenko note that “[b]y virtue of
their closeness to the citizenry, local governments are already adept at
fielding input from the community, be it through school boards, zoning
boards, arts commissions, or neighborhood councils.”353 Of course, it
follows that local police may develop policies that vary in significant
ways from one locale to the next, but as Friedman sees it this is “the sign
of a healthy democratic process at work.”354
The local surveillance ordinances described in this Article epitomize
what Friedman has in mind by democratic policing. To begin with, the
primary goals of the surveillance ordinances adopted (or under
consideration) in Seattle and New York City are transparency and
accountability, which are also the primary mechanism for achieving
secondary goals such as adapting to changes in technology, restoring and
maintaining public trust, and balancing public safety and civil liberties.
Both surveillance ordinances are well-designed to achieve these goals by
requiring the SPD and NYPD to prepare and make publicly available
detailed reports describing their use of covered surveillance technologies
(and surveillance data in Seattle) as well as related rules, policies, and
practices. Such transparency allows privacy advocates to generate
348. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 96–98.
349. Id. at 98.
350. Id. at 313–15.
351. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1886–87.
352. See
generally
POLICING
PROJECT
(2017),
https://policingproject.org/
[https://perma.cc/YVB3-CFLH].
353. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 119, at 1888 (emphasis added).
354. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 96.
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politically relevant information about privacy protection. This, in turn,
fosters research and analysis and allows advocates working behind the
scenes to assist the SPD and NYPD in improving their practices,
commenting on proposed uses, and, when necessary, exerting leverage
through the threat of bad publicity.355
The Seattle and New York City ordinances differ in two important
respects: the former defines surveillance technology and data very broadly
and establishes an approval process for numerous items, while the latter
ignores data and relies solely on transparency without a separate process
of approval by a political branch. In effect, the POST Act tries to force the
police to “own” any decision to rely on new surveillance technology by
requiring disclosures that might prove controversial or embarrassing if
publicized. It is too soon to say which approach will prove more effective.
The Seattle process gives elected representatives the final word but
imposes significant costs and potential backlogs and delays in securing
approvals. The New York City process may force the NYPD to beef up
privacy protections to avoid negative publicity. But if the NYPD views a
new surveillance technology as essential for securing public safety, it may
be willing to absorb the bad press given the lack of political oversight.
Moreover, since the proposed bill includes audits but no penalties for noncompliance, the NYPD is subject to little risk if its internal cost-benefit
calculations favor pushing the envelope to the outer boundaries of what
the POST Act allows.
The Seattle and New York City policies concerning the use of bodyworn cameras and the use, retention, and disclosure of related video
footage also demonstrate the power of local policymaking. In both cities,
a court-appointed monitor supervised the policymaking process under the
terms of a consent decree; in Washington, state law sets minimum
requirements for body-worn camera policies. And yet both cities engaged
in extensive consultation with stakeholders and followed highly
democratic processes in shaping policies that remain subject to future
revision based on further experience and review.
2.

Closing the Public Surveillance Gap

One of the main virtues of local surveillance ordinances is that they
close the public surveillance gap by developing transparency and
accountability mechanisms free of Fourth Amendment doctrinal
constraints present in recent cases such as Jones and Carpenter. These
mechanisms apply even when the government uses panvasive
355. See COLIN J. BENNETT, THE PRIVACY ADVOCATES: RESISTING THE SPREAD OF
SURVEILLANCE 95–132 (2008) (describing these and other modes of privacy advocacy).
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technologies. They are also independent of federal and state electronic
surveillance laws with their obscure and outdated definitions of electronic
communications and services. Rather, the local surveillance ordinances
apply to (almost) all surveillance technologies, irrespective of whether
they monitor public or private spaces. These ordinances require law
enforcement to prepare and submit impact reports on a technology-bytechnology basis, thereby allowing elected officials or the public to
determine whether it is appropriate for a city to acquire and use such
technology.356 This is a remarkable and welcome development in U.S.
surveillance law.
How broadly do these surveillance ordinances apply? In particular, do
they apply to video surveillance and the other components of the DAS?
The answer both varies by city and remains to be seen based on local
practices, interpretations, legal challenges, and political oversight. For
example, the Seattle ordinance excludes body-worn cameras, but the SPD
has a separate body-worn camera policy.357 The ordinance also excludes
cameras installed for a single purpose—such as solely to record traffic
violations, for security purposes, or to protect the physical integrity of city
infrastructure.358 The POST Act similarly excludes “cameras installed to
monitor and protect the physical integrity of city infrastructure.”359 These
exceptions will have to be interpreted and applied, although they seem
narrow enough to avoid a blanket exemption for something like the
DAS.360
3.

Closing the Fair Information Practices Gap

As for data governance, the two cities rely on a similar set of privacy
principles, although Seattle’s ordinance covers collection, use, and
disclosure limitations as well as accuracy and accountability, while New
York City’s chiefly addresses the collection, retention, and disclosure of
identifying and sensitive information. Seattle has a more expansive
program than New York City, not so much in terms of breadth (both laws
apply to all city departments) but rather in terms of depth (Seattle places
a much a greater emphasis on PIAs). However, both the PIA process in
Seattle and the biennial city agency reports in New York City serve a very

356. See supra sections II.A.1, II.B.1.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 173–206.
358. See supra note 161.
359. POST Act, supra note 268.
360. The Santa Clara County surveillance ordinance avoids this issue by defining “surveillance
technology” in extremely broad terms and supplying examples that match up with every component
of the DAS. See SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES div. A40, § A40-7(c) (2018).

14 - Rubinstein (3).docx (Do Not Delete)

2020

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

1/6/2019 12:43 PM

[Vol. 93:1961

similar purpose to SORNs and PIAs under the federal Privacy Act and the
related E-Government Act. As noted above, these laws apply exclusively
to federal agencies. Furthermore, New York’s Privacy Act does not
require any processes similar to SORNs or PIAs, whereas Washington
does not even have a Privacy Act. Thus, it falls to the Seattle and New
York City privacy laws to ensure that both cities take advantage of these
processes at the local level.
It seems likely that Seattle’s program will yield superior results to that
of New York City’s thanks to its reliance on PIAs. To date, Seattle has
published nine PIAs on a range of programs.361 The first PIA addressed
smart meter deployment by Seattle City Light (the city-owned electric
utility).362 Privacy activists initially objected to this program, fearing that
smart meters might be “misused to act as data collection devices which
make previously private activities inside our dwellings subject to
unauthorized official and criminal surveillance.”363 Seattle City Light
responded by developing an opt-out option and limiting data collection
and transmission.364 The Seattle CPO not only prepared a PIA, but it also
hired an outside law firm to suggest actions to mitigate potential privacy
risks.365 Nevertheless, the ACLU-WA voiced significant concerns about
the smart meter program, criticizing the smart meter PIA as unclear,
inadequate, and incomplete.366 A year later, the Seattle City Council
passed a new ordinance prohibiting the sale of utility consumers’ sensitive
personal data and limiting its use only for utility service and related
purposes.367 More recent PIAs have not resulted in similar controversies.
361. Technology Privacy Impact Assessments, CITY OF SEATTLE (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://data.seattle.gov/City-Business/Technology-Privacy-Impact-Assessments/5mii-56rx
[https://perma.cc/FCF6-P6VD].
362. CITY OF SEATTLE, CITY OF SEATTLE PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (2017),
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/Tech/AMI-PIA-FINAL-Rev2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VB47-ED7E].
363. See, e.g., Molly Connelly & Jan Bultmann, Seattle City Light: Seattleites Need an Opt-In
Policy
for
Smart
Meters,
SEATTLE
PRIVACY
COAL.
(Mar.
3,
2014),
https://www.seattleprivacy.org/advanced-metering-devices-and-customer-choice/
[https://perma.cc/L95N-4YJQ].
364. Advanced Metering: Opt-Out Policy, CITY OF SEATTLE, http://www.seattle.gov/light/ami/optout.asp [https://perma.cc/626F-H8D8].
365. CITY OF SEATTLE, CITY OF SEATTLE PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 362; About
the Privacy Program, CITY OF SEATTLE, http://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/privacy/about-theprivacy-program [https://perma.cc/38F8-MUDA].
366. Letter from Shankar Narayan, Tech. & Liberty Project Dir., ACLU Wash., to Kshama Sawant,
Energy & Env’t Comm. Chair, Seattle City Council (May 25, 2017) (discussing Seattle City Light’s
Advanced Meter Program), https://www.aclu-wa.org/file/101692/download?token=ujQJA9l9
[https://perma.cc/7TXC-VCTJ].
367. Seattle City Council Adopts Nation’s Strongest Law to Protect Utility Customer Personal
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III. THE CHALLENGES OF PRIVACY LOCALISM
As the previous discussion demonstrates, privacy localism—as
exemplified by Seattle and New York City’s adoption of local
surveillance laws or policies and citywide privacy principles—responds
to longstanding deficiencies in federal and state privacy protection and
helps close the public surveillance and fair information practices gaps in
privacy law. Despite these achievements, privacy localism remains
vulnerable to objections on multiple fronts. To begin with, skeptics may
ask: why analyze local privacy regulation in terms of localism rather than
federalism? How are they different? And even though a few cities have
taken tentative steps to regulate local surveillance activity and local
government data practices, do cities have sufficient power to pursue or
sustain local solutions to pressing privacy issues? Isn’t this unlikely given
the threat of federal or state legislation eventually preempting these local
efforts? This Part moves beyond the details of local privacy regulation in
Seattle and New York City to explore two conceptual challenges: the
distinction between localism and federalism and the factors enabling
privacy localism to sustain its momentum in face of the dual threats of
federal preemption and limited power and immunity from state
preemption. This Part concludes that despite these threats, privacy
localism is more robust than one might think.
A.

Localism or Federalism?

Cities—including Seattle and New York City—are beginning to
experiment with innovative approaches to protecting the privacy of their
local residents in the face of inadequate federal and state privacy laws.
These cities understand that pervasive public surveillance and massive
data collection erode civil liberties and engender mistrust of local
government, including (most crucially) local police departments. And
they recognize that the time for action is now, especially in view of the
public surveillance gap and the fair information practices gap.
Additionally, these innovative cities are experimenting with a novel
approach. On the surveillance side, they are not mimicking one-off state
laws by addressing specific invasive technologies in response to public
outcry.368 Rather, they have devised comprehensive, iterative methods for
reviewing all surveillance technologies prior to purchasing or deploying

Data, ACLU WASH. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/seattle-city-council-adoptsnation%E2%80%99s-strongest-law-protect-utility-customer-personal-data [https://perma.cc/VTU2JYYJ].
368. See infra section III.D.1.
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them, using procedures that not only capture emerging technologies but
allow cities to reassess prior decisions in light of new threat assessments
and other changes in local conditions. On the smart city side, they are
adopting risk-based principles and methodologies that support privacyprotective data-sharing programs consistent with their ambitious goals to
achieve growth, sustainability, resiliency, and equity. Finally, these cities
are proceeding in the best tradition of local autonomy. They are
experimenting with diverse solutions that reflect key differences in how
their political leaders weigh the social costs of surveillance against the
risk of catastrophic losses of a potential terrorist attack,369 or the tradeoffs
between maximizing openness and minimizing privacy risks.370 This
sounds a lot like federalism, or federalism with a local flavor, or perhaps
just localism. Although the literature on federalism is vast, the following
section briefly highlights a few key ideas and situates privacy localism
within mainstream accounts of dual sovereignty and cooperative
federalism.
In Gregory v. Ashcroft,371 Justice O’Connor identified five advantages
of “our federalism”:
It [1] assures a decentralized government that will be more
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; [2] it
increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes; [3] it allows for more innovation and experimentation
in government; . . . [4] it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile
citizenry . . . . Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist
system is [5] a check on abuses of government power.372
Privacy localism, as described in the Seattle and New York City case
studies, certainly exhibits diversity, increased participation,
experimentation and innovation, responsiveness, and accountability. But
Justice O’Connor embedded these instrumental values in a theory of
federalism known as “dual sovereignty.”373 There are several reasons to
369. It is not surprising that New York City’s surveillance law contemplates a less onerous review
process than the one adopted in Seattle, given the former’s sheer size, the number and importance of
its landmark buildings, its losses in the 9/11 attack, and the human and symbolic importance of
keeping the city safe from future attacks.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 219–25 and 326–33.
371. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
372. Id. at 458; see Richard Briffault, What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1994) (analyzing the instrumental values
of federalism).
373. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457 (“We begin with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States
possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations
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disentangle these values from dual sovereignty in formulating a theory of
privacy localism.
To begin with, the traditional concerns of dual sovereignty have little
bearing on privacy regulation with the exception of Reno v. Condon,374 a
decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a Tenth Amendment
challenge to the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA),375 a federal law
regulating the privacy of state motor vehicle records.376 In Condon, the
state of South Carolina challenged the DPPA, which regulates the sale and
distribution by state Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs) of personal
information in motor vehicle records.377 The DPPA prohibits DMV
personnel from disclosing driver’s personal information in motor vehicle
records without the subject’s consent, requires certain disclosures of
personal information for public safety purposes, enumerates permissible
uses, and restricts the resale and re-disclosure of such information by
private persons who have lawfully obtained that information from a state
DMV.378 Apart from Condon, there is scant evidence of legislatures,
courts, or scholars treating government restrictions on the collection, use,
and disclosure of personal data as a power reserved to the states for their
exclusive control or viewing federal lawmaking in this area as necessarily
intruding upon state sovereignty.379
In upholding the DPPA, the Condon Court overturned lower court
decisions invalidating this law as incompatible with the anticommandeering doctrine as developed in New York v. United States380 and
Printz v. United States381 The Court distinguished these cases on two
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.” (alteration omitted) (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458
(1990)). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 256
(5th ed. 2015).
374. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
375. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012)).
376. Condon, 528 U.S. at 141–42.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 144.
379. The privacy torts are the obvious exception. Tort law is primarily state law, not federal law.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625A (AM. LAW INST. 1977); SOLOVE &
SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 32–33. However, the privacy torts play
little role in addressing the concerns raised by local surveillance or local government data practices.
380. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (invalidating a federal law regulating the disposal of radioactive
wastes on the grounds that “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program”).
381. 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down a federal law requiring state and local law
enforcement personnel to conduct background checks before issuing permits for firearms and
reaffirming that “[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
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grounds: first, that the DPPA was prohibiting, not requiring state
government actions; and, second, that the statute is generally applicable
because it “regulates the universe of entities that participate as suppliers
to the market for motor vehicle information.”382 Many commentators have
criticized the first argument as resting on a dubious distinction between
affirmative and negative duties.383 After all, most duties can be
characterized either way. The second argument is more compelling,
although as Professor Chemerinsky notes skeptically, it leaves open the
possibility that Congress could reenact the laws at issue in New York and
Printz “by making sure that some private conduct was regulated by them
also.”384 But apart from this single decision, disputes over the limits of
federal power have almost no bearing on the evolution of privacy law at
the federal, state, or local level.
Another problem with dual sovereignty is that it tends to evoke a
conservative political agenda and the use of “States’ rights” to deprive
individuals of their civil and voting rights, especially in the Jim Crow
South.385 But as Dean Heather Gerken observes, “[i]t is a mistake to
equate federalism’s past with its future.”386 Gerken and others have
developed a progressive theory of federalism that not only
reconceptualizes intergovernmental relations but also seeks to
demonstrate the benefits of decentralization for achieving progressive
goals.387 She argues that “[s]tate and local governments have become sites
of empowerment for racial minorities and dissenters” who can wield more

address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions,
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program”).
382. Condon, 528 U.S. at 151.
383. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Right Result, Wrong Reasons: Reno v. Condon, 25 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 823, 827–28 (2000).
384. Id. at 828.
385. Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY (2012),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/LA5LBCQU].
386. Id.
387. Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address at the New York University School of Law’s Thomas
M. Jorde Symposium: Federalism 3.0 (Mar. 1, 2017); see also Richard Thompson Ford, The New
Blue Federalists: The Case for Liberal Federalism, SLATE (Jan. 6, 2005, 5:56 PM),
https://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/01/the_new_blue_federalists.
html [https://perma.cc/2DJU-NSY2] (noting that “the legal arguments once used to invalidate liberal
policies are equally applicable to federal laws favored by conservatives”); Ernest A. Young, Welcome
to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1277, 1279 (2004) (analyzing state and local non-cooperation with federal anti-terrorism
measures).
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electoral power at the local level than at the national level, allowing them
to become “efficacious political actors.”388
Professor Richard Schragger makes a similar argument about the need
to decouple “the rhetoric of decentralization” from “anti-government
conservatives” while emphasizing the role of cities in advancing
progressive policy developments.389 Schragger describes a surge in local
activity across a range of controversial policy issues such as workers’
rights, healthcare, campaign finance, climate change, marriage equality,
and immigration, which he attributes to two main factors: the growing
dissatisfaction among progressives with the national responses to these
problems and the renewed economic growth and political clout of cities.390
In advocating for what he calls a “progressive decentralism,” he argues
that “[t]he localness of regulatory initiatives is their greatest strength,
permitting regulatory innovation to start small and develop as efforts are
made and programs are improved upon.”391 Privacy localism has far more
in common with Gerken’s “progressive federalism” and Schragger’s
“progressive decentralism” than with stale theories of dual sovereignty.
Schragger describes municipal policy developments that respond to
specific political dynamics. Some policy developments (like living wage
campaigns and health care mandates) mainly respond to the absence of
federal or state activity.392 Others (like campaign finance, climate change,
and marriage equality) mainly attempt to spur policy activity at higher
levels of government by experimenting at the local level.393 Still, others
(like immigration policy) mainly reflect tensions between federal and
state or local authorities over which level of government controls the

388. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, supra note 385. Gerken elaborates on these themes
in Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005); Heather K. Gerken,
The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4
(2010).
389. Richard C. Schragger, The Progressive City, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM,
LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 39–46 (Rachel Deutsch et al. eds., 2008).
390. Id. at 39, 40–44.
391. Id. at 42.
392. Upper levels of government may be inactive due to political gridlock, uncertainty over the
wisdom of uniform state or national treatment, or the greater salience of the issue in question in some
localities but not others. See Richard Briffault, Local Leadership and National Issues, in WHY THE
LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY, supra note 389, at
67, 74–79.
393. As Professor Richard Briffault observes: “Local successes can build political support for state
or national actions, and local failures can spark the search for different solutions.” Id. at 79.
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relevant policy domain.394 The point is that there are not only a range of
local policy initiatives but also many different localisms.395
Finally, while the dual sovereignty doctrine often leads to
constitutional disputes over the limits of federal power and hence the
policing of federal-state relations by the U.S. Supreme Court, localism
turns on the regulatory authority of local governments. And this mostly
boils down to the subtle interplay of empowerment and immunity that
local governments enjoy under state “home rule” provisions,396 which are
discussed below in section III.C. Thus, privacy localism is far removed
from traditional concerns over the limits of federal power or the
desirability of maintaining separate federal and state spheres of power and
authority.
As to cooperative federalism, the leading alternative to dual
sovereignty, one might expect that privacy localism would have more in
common with this doctrine given that it seeks to capture the benefits of
decentralization and local autonomy while preserving the primacy of the
federal government in setting national priorities and prescribing standards
through which to advance those priorities.397 But this is not the case.
Cooperative federalism—and alternative accounts like Professors
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken’s “uncooperative federalism”398 or Professor
Davidson’s “cooperative localism”399—amount to top-down accounts of
the role local governments play in carrying out, dissenting from, or
modifying federal programs. In sharp contrast, privacy localism requires
394. See Christina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and
Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2095–98 (2014).
395. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 124–29 (2013) (arguing that
Second Amendment doctrine and state preemption laws should incorporate differences between urban
and rural gun use and regulation); Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 725, 800–
11 (2012) (objecting to state laws prohibiting local governments from creating their own broadband
infrastructure to fill the service gap left by major broadband providers); see also Nestor M. Davidson,
Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 596 (2017) (identifying three structural dimensions
of local government: vertical local-state relationships; horizontal local-local relationships; and
internal relationships within a single local government). This Article focuses almost exclusively on
the vertical dimension.
396. Davidson, supra note 395, at 570–71.
397. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of
State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 966 (2007).
398. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118. YALE L.J. 1256
(2009). The co-authors coin the term to emphasize that federal and state governments may be
understood, not only in terms of rivalry (dual sovereignty) or collaboration (cooperative federalism),
but also in terms of dissent and resistance.
399. Davidson, Cooperative Localism, supra note 397. Davidson coins this term to emphasize the
importance of direct federal-local relations as opposed to the almost exclusive interest in federal-state
interactions that still dominates debates over dual sovereignty.
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a bottom-up account of how local law shapes local government activity in
connection with potential challenges and conflicts from federal and state
law.
A related point is that the federal government has created many privacy
laws but has not implemented them by designing and funding federal
regulatory programs. Obviously, there are many privacy laws addressing
the data practices of federal agencies and specific sectors of the economy
as well as the confidentiality of communications sought by law
enforcement or national security agencies. But these laws do not create or
require state officials to administer and implement federal privacy
programs in the way that they administer and implement federal welfare,
environmental, health care, immigration, or law enforcement programs.
Federal regulatory programs typically work by setting standards that
must be satisfied to obtain federal funding.400 These programs are not
usually analyzed in terms of dual sovereignty but rather under the rubric
of cooperative federalism, which rejects the idea of separate national and
state spheres of powers and responsibilities in favor of more collaborative
federal-state relationships in a variety of regulatory contexts.401 Under
cooperative federalism, federal agencies rely on state assistance in
carrying out federal regulatory programs. As Professor Spencer Admur
notes, this may entail “state entities disbursing federal funds, federal and
state regulators developing joint regulatory standards, or collaborative
enforcement.”402 A striking feature of cooperative federalism is that
federal agencies use “inducement strategies” to secure state and local
assistance and aid such as solicitation, offers, trades, threats, prohibitions
and mandates.403 These, in turn, raise numerous and complex
constitutional issues regarding constraints on federal power under the
commandeering prohibition and the newly-minted coercion

400. Medicaid is an obvious example. States operate their Medicaid programs within federal
standards and a wide range of state options in exchange for federal matching funds. See Samantha
Artiga et al., Current Flexibility in Medicaid: An Overview of Federal Standards and State Options,
KFF (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/current-flexibility-in-medicaid-anoverview-of-federal-standards-and-state-options/ [https://perma.cc/DRM5-Y4G3].
401. See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of
the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695–96 (2001).
402. Spencer E. Admur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and the New Cooperative
Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 90 n.10 (2016).
403. Id. at 88.
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prohibition.404 Very few federal privacy programs employ such
inducement strategies.405
As noted above, Condon turns on the fact that “[t]he DPPA regulates
the States as the owners of data bases.”406 But this is the sole case
suggesting that principles of federalism are relevant to the interaction of
federal and state/local regulation of privacy. No other federal privacy
statute so directly regulates state programs. Nor have there been any
successful challenges to federal privacy laws on the grounds that they
violate the anti-commandeering doctrine.407 One reason for this is that
both Condon and Printz articulate the anti-commandeering doctrine as a
limit on what Congress can force states to do regarding federal regulatory
programs. As the Court emphasizes, Congress can neither “compel the
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program” nor command
state officials “to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”408
When it comes to privacy law and policy, however, there are few if any
“federal regulatory programs” whose primary concern is the disclosure or
safeguarding of personal information.
For example, there are no programs that promote privacy by providing
federal funds to train chief privacy officers in how to establish and manage
a privacy program or conduct effective privacy impact assessment
404. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (striking down the provision
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that conditioned all of a state’s Medicaid funding on its acceptance
of the statute’s expansion of Medicaid because this limit on conditional spending was
unconstitutionally coercive).
405. One of the few exceptions is the State Health Information Exchange (HIE) Cooperative
Agreement Program, which is a federally funded program “to rapidly build capacity for exchanging
health information across the health care system both within and across states.” Office of the Nat’l
Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., State Health Information Exchange, HEALTHIT.GOV (Mar. 14,
2014), https://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/state-health-information-exchange
[https://perma.cc/9DF9-4Y5S].
406. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
407. See Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst. Inc. v. Inacom Commc’ns, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1150 (4th Cir.
1997) (upholding the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s grant of exclusive enforcement
jurisdiction to state courts against a New York challenge); Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 308 F. Supp.
2d 911, 925 (E.D. Wis. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 403 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a
Printz commandeering challenge against the ECPA); Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v. United
States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1344 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (upholding IRS provision that required political
organizations to disclose state and local political contributions or lose federal filing status); Ass’n of
Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1126
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (sustaining HIPAA-related privacy regulations); Citicasters, Inc. v. McCaskill, 883
F. Supp. 1282, 1288 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (rejecting challenge to the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,
which forbade disclosure of materials seized in law enforcement investigations to third parties);
Michigan v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 974, 979–80 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff’d, 835 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to the ECPA).
408. Condon, 528 U.S. at 149.
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techniques based on risk analysis or the design and development of
privacy-preserving technologies.409 And while a few federal agencies do
engage in such activities—notably, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
the National Institute of Standards (NIST), and the National Science
Foundation (NSF)—they do so by bringing enforcement actions, issuing
guidelines and, holding workshops (FTC); issuing standards and
conducting research (NIST); and funding academics to engage in privacy
engineering research (NSF). They do not carry out these tasks by creating
regulatory programs that state and local officials administer and
implement with federal funding. They could, but they do not.410
Of course, there are federal programs that require federal-state
cooperation and raise privacy concerns. Most of these are domestic
intelligence programs that rely very heavily on local actors to conduct
surveillance, profiling-based investigation, and data collection and
sharing. A few such programs condition grants and funding on federal
guidelines “such as information-sharing protocols to promote uniformity
as well as privacy standards.”411 But a closer look at these privacy
standards shows that they amount to little more than assistance in
developing a privacy policy—and no one who works in the privacy field
would confuse posting a privacy policy with a full-fledged “privacy
program.” This may sound like hairsplitting. But domestic intelligence
programs are not about privacy. They are about national security and
consist of federal efforts to promote local national security activities by
(1) providing “resources and training to state and local police forces to
help them establish intelligence units, build databases, and develop
standards for intelligence gathering”412 or (2) funding state-operated
fusion centers to “compile, analyze, and route electronically stored law
enforcement and investigative information, including public as well as
private sector data.”413 That said, the privacy aspects of national security
programs have resulted in a limited set of disputes between federal and

409. COMPUTING CMTY. CONSORTIUM, PRIVACY BY DESIGN—ENGINEERING PRIVACY (2015),
https://cra.org/ccc/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/12/PbD3-Workshop-Report-v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2E4-XDPR].
410. See Crump, supra note 23, at 1658 (noting that “the federal government could require that all
federally funded surveillance technology be governed by a data management protocol that addresses
the fundamental questions of data collection, retention, use, and sharing”). This would amount to a
federal privacy program.
411. Waxman, supra note 48, at 312.
412. Id. at 307.
413. Id. at 308.
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state or local officials that resemble conflicts over federalism.414 But they
are weak examples at best of federal privacy programs.
To sum up: the two most prominent conceptions of federalism—dual
federalism and cooperative federalism—make assumptions about the
interaction of federal, state, and local government officials and the
existence of federal regulatory programs that do not match up very well
with the current structure of privacy law. Cooperative federalism is clearly
better suited than dual sovereignty for the task of understanding top-down
federal programs in which Congress provides the basic legal framework
and delegates to a federal agency the power to administer the program in
collaboration with state and local officials.415 While this model sheds light
on the workings of domestic intelligence programs, both cooperative (and
uncooperative) federalism seem far less useful in understanding bottomup programs in which local governments use their own regulatory powers
to overcome gaps in federal policy.416 Privacy localism, in contrast, does
not depend on local government prevailing in disputes with state (or
federal) authorities but instead tends to (1) fill gaps in existing federal and
state privacy law or (2) where such laws exist, raises the floor established
by federal or state constitutional or statutory rules.
Perhaps the best approach to federalism for purposes of understanding
local privacy regulation is that of Professor Cristina Rodriguez, who sees
federalism as consisting not in a “fixed set of relationships” but instead
treats its parameters as “subject to ongoing negotiation by the players in
the system, according to the advantages each might accrue from a
particular set of relations.”417 This more flexible approach enables
Rodriguez to focus on how debates over controversial social welfare
issues like immigration, marriage equality, drug policy, and healthcare
reform—and perhaps local surveillance and smart city initiatives as

414. Several scholars have argued that so-called “anti-Patriot Act resolutions” show state and local
officials relying on the anti-commandeering doctrine to push back against federal policies that
threaten individual liberty. See generally Ann Althouse, The Vigor of the Anti-Commandeering
Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1232–34 (2004); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken,
supra note 398; Young, supra note 364.
415. See Weiser, supra note 401, at 1695–1703.
416. Although Bulman-Pozen and Gerken offer an account of the ways in which state and local
officials can resist mandates and challenge federal authority, their theory of uncooperative federalism
shares certain assumptions with cooperative federalism as to the primacy of federal regulatory
programs. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 398, at 1271 (stating that “[m]uch of
uncooperative federalism takes place in the interstices of federal mandates”).
417. Rodriguez, supra note 394, at 2095.

14 - Rubinstein (3).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

1/6/2019 12:43 PM

PRIVACY LOCALISM

2031

well—play out in what she calls “the discretionary spaces of
federalism.”418
B.

Federal Preemption

Congress’s broad preemption power allows it to block, limit, or
invalidate local privacy laws; federal preemption may be express or
implied.419 Implied preemption covers both field preemption, where
federal regulation is so pervasive that Congress leaves no room for state
laws on the subject, and conflict preemption, where compliance with both
federal and state law is impossible, or state laws undermine the
accomplishment of Congressional objectives.420
The leading privacy casebook implicates twenty-four relevant federal
privacy statutes.421 A review of these statutes shows that none of them
interfere with the city-level privacy regulation under consideration in this
Article; indeed, only two sufficiently overlap with local privacy laws to
require extended analysis.422 The two are ECPA, the federal electronic
418. Id. at 2097–98.
419. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96–98 (1992).
420. Id.
421. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, supra note 1, at 37–40. The total of
twenty-four privacy statutes requires subtracting from the co-authors’ list several laws that merely
amend or expand existing laws and adding in several laws that are considered elsewhere in their case
book such as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), supra at 609–12, and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Act, supra at 865.
422. Twelve of the twenty-four statutes may be dispensed with immediately because they only
apply to federal agencies, see Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, or
to exclusively federal activity like foreign intelligence gathering, see Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2012); USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended under scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (amending FISA
and ECPA, and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008). Others only apply to specific sectors such as
banks, see Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-2 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C.), or telecommunication providers, see Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012), or they may govern
all federal, state, and local governmental agencies in a very narrow sphere, see Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401; Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, or all
employers in a narrow sphere, see Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, or restrict permissible uses of a very limited type of
record, see Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725, or criminalize certain
conduct not at issue here, see Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028, Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1801. Nine more of the remaining
twelve statues fall away because they regulate commercial data held by private firms, either via
sectoral laws, see Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (see also the Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending and updating the FCRA)), Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551; Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711,
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surveillance statute, and HIPAA, the federal statute governing the privacy
of certain medical records.423 Few federal privacy laws include express
preemption clauses424 and those that do typically establish a “floor”—that
is, a minimum standard that states may exceed.425 Both ECPA and HIPAA
lack preemption clauses and establish a federal floor that states may
exceed.
ECPA has three parts: an updated version of the Wiretap Act; the
Stored Communication Act (SCA); and the Pen Register Act
(PRA).426Although state wiretap laws have been in existence for nearly
the same period as the Wiretap Act, the federal law does not preempt these
state enactments. To the contrary, looking to the legislative history of the
Wiretap Act, the Senate Report states: “The proposed provision envisions
that States would be free to adopt more restrictive legislation, or no
legislation at all, but not less restrictive legislation.”427 Rather, the Wiretap
Act is a classic example of a federal privacy floor.428 Nearly every state

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227, Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809,
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003,15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713, or consumer protection laws, and thus have little
to do with the privacy aspects of government activity, see Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45; Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2009. Finally, the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A), is mainly a federal
conditional funding law, which also protects the privacy of student records containing personal
information directly related to a student and maintained by any educational agency or institution. But
FERPA establishes a federal floor for student record confidentiality and access that does not preempt
states from enacting more privacy-protective restrictions. See id.
423. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
424. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 112, at 187–93
(identifying CAN-SPAM, COPPA, FCRA, and the PPA as privacy statutes that contain a preemption
clause).
425. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 45 at 919–22.
426. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2709.
427. See S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 98 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2187. At
least one court has held that ECPA preempts California’s wiretap law, see Bunnell v. Motion Picture
Ass’n of Am., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 155–56 (C.D. Cal. 2007), but the court’s reasoning seems flawed.
See PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY, supra note 103, § 6.2.6.
428. See Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 45, at 919–20. Schwartz points out while
the VPPA and GLB Act also set a federal “floor” for privacy, “federal privacy legislation has also
preempted state legislation with the effect of weakening existing state standards,” citing FACTA as
an example. Id. But FACTA was a trade-off between the credit industry and consumer advocates,
with the former motivated to support several measures that strengthened consumer credit laws in
exchange for making permanent certain preemption provisions in FCRA that were otherwise set to
expire. See Federal Law Targets ID Theft, CONSUMER ACTION (Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.consumeraction.org/news/articles/fall_2004#Topic_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NUL-8KUD]. Indeed, FACTA
is the only example of a federal privacy law that reverses existing state safeguards.
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has its own surveillance laws closely patterned on the Wiretap Act,429 and
a dozen states have laws that exceed federal standards by enacting “all
party” consent laws that are more restrictive than the “one party” rule
under the Wiretap Act.430 As for the SCA, most states do not protect
communications held in storage by an electronic service (such as an email
provider) in the same manner as the SCA.431 Rather, similar protections
are more commonly found in state privacy, consumer protection, or
utilities regulation laws. Circuits are split regarding the preemptive effect
of the SCA.432 Finally, about half the states have laws regulating devices
that capture outgoing or incoming phone calls and many of these laws are
modeled on the PRA.433 A review of these laws confirms that they closely
resemble the PRA. Like the Wiretap Act, the PRA does not preempt
stricter state laws.434 In short, ECPA imposes few, if any, limits on states
wishing to enact electronic communications legislation that is more
protective than federal law.
HIPAA applies to health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and
healthcare providers and therefore regulates government agencies that
engage in covered activities including local governments. The statute is
quite clear that it provides a baseline of privacy protections but does not
preempt more stringent state laws.435 HIPAA also regulates disclosure of
“protected health information” to law enforcement, permitting disclosure
without consent or authorization if required by a court order, warrant, or
subpoena when certain additional requirements are met.436
In short, the only two federal privacy laws that arguably overlap with
local privacy laws do not actually prevent states or cities from enacting
more stringent requirements. Further, local governments are not
especially active in separately regulating electronic surveillance or
protected health information, likely because ECPA and HIPAA already
do so; there is little evidence that cities are seeking to innovate in these
arenas by enacting local laws. Rather, local government officials follow
429. PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY, supra note 103, at § 6.2.5.
430. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 45, at 920.
431. The exception is Pennsylvania. See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5741 (West 2018)
(criminalizing unauthorized access to stored data).
432. See Prohibited Voluntary Disclosure under Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2701–2712 (2012), 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 §§ 93–94 (2016).
433. See Bellia, supra note 45, at 882 n.50 (2009).
434. The main prohibition in the PRA begins with the phrase: “Unless prohibited by State Law,”
which suggests that Congress anticipated states enacting stricter standards. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3122(a)(2). The Bill’s legislative history supports this position as well. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at
46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3600.
435. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(A) (2018).
436. See id. § 164.512(2)(B).
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the law of each higher level of government within the federal-state-local
hierarchy, thereby meeting the federal floor or exceeding it when the
applicable state standard is more protective. Thus, these two federal
privacy laws are controlling when city officials can access, collect, use, or
disclose electronic communications or protected health information. But
in the absence of preemptive provisions and given the lack of activity at
the local level, these laws do not seem to constrain local efforts to regulate
surveillance technology or data governance practices.
C.

The Threat of State Overrides Due to Lack of City Power

Do cities have sufficient power to regulate privacy at the local level?
At first glance, it appears not. Of the three levels of government in the
United States, city government is certainly weaker than federal or state
government in terms of political power, fiscal resources, and
constitutional standing.437 Indeed, the conventional view is that, as subnational governments, cities enjoy only those specific powers granted to
them under state constitutions and statutes, with the result that governors
and state legislatures inevitably play an ongoing role in city
governance.438 States may also exercise powers over cities free from
federal constitutional constraints or injunctive relief.439 Thus, states can
and do control or stymie urban initiatives even when they have the strong
backing of powerful mayors.440
Local government autonomy has two aspects: the ability to initiate
policy and the ability to resist encroachment from another governmental
entity or from a private party.441 Both aspects of local autonomy rest on
what is known as “home rule.”442 Until the early twentieth century, many
states limited the power of local governments to undertake independent
action without a specific delegation of authority under a doctrine known
437. See generally GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE
URBAN INNOVATION (2008); RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBAL AGE (2016).
438. Barron, supra note 24, at 390; Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
7–8 (1990).
439. See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 437, at 44; SCHRAGGER, supra note 407, at 79.
440. See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 437, at ix–xiii (describing the New York State constraints
on New York City’s (former) Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s power to alleviate Manhattan traffic by
introducing congestion pricing).
441. Professor Nestor M. Davidson refers to these two aspects as empowerment and immunity,
respectively. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism, supra note 397, at 967 (2007); see also
RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 346 (8th ed.
2016) (describing two aspects of home rule, which they refer to as “initiative” and “immunity”).
442. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 437, at 31–43.
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as “Dillon’s Rule.”443 Home rule reverses the presumption in Dillon’s
Rule by giving local government the authority to take many kinds of
action without state permission. Today, over forty states delegate this
authority to local governments.444 Home rule may be constitutional or
statutory or a mixture of the two. Whatever the structure a state adopts,
home rule empowers local governments by delegating broad—but by no
means unlimited—regulatory and spending authority.445
Cities generally have sufficient power to make policy decisions about
(1) local policing including surveillance activities and (2) local municipal
services including any privacy safeguards applicable to the collection,
use, and disclosure of personal data by local government agencies. Local
policing is the paradigm case of regulatory power or what is more
commonly referred to as “police power,” the term used to describe state
and local government’s general authority over health, safety, and
welfare.446 Police power encompasses creating and managing a local
police force and providing and managing municipal services. Arguably,
this is true in every state, city, and town in the United States. It is certainly
true in both Seattle and New York City.
D.

State Preemption

Unlike federal preemption and lack of city power, state preemption of
local privacy regulation poses a more serious and ongoing threat to
privacy localism. Although state preemption of local laws generally
follows the same analytic model as federal preemption,447 there are over
700 state privacy statutes,448 which make for a crowded regulatory arena
that may leave little room for local privacy law. As noted above,
progressive cities are increasingly taking the lead on a broad range of
policy issues—but some states are fighting back. States have preempted
local authority in areas ranging from labor and employment (such as local

443. See Paul A. Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1140 (2007); Hugh D.
Spitzer, Home Rule vs. Dillon’s Rule for Washington Cities, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 809, 813–24
(2015).
444. RICHARD BRIFFAULT ET AL., AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, THE
TROUBLING TURN IN STATE PREEMPTION: THE ASSAULT ON PROGRESSIVE CITIES AND HOW CITIES
CAN RESPOND 3 (2017), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/ACS_Issue_Brief__Preemption_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/56NC-GWVQ].
445. Id.
446. See Diller, supra note 443, at 1123 n.47.
447. Id. at 1140 (noting differences in a few states not relevant here).
448. See generally ROBERT E. SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS
(2015).
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minimum wage rules), to civil rights (local anti-discrimination laws), to
environmental protection (local fracking rules), to public health (local
tobacco regulation), to immigration law (sanctuary cities).449 Thus, both
now and in the future, the greatest challenge to privacy localism comes
from the possibility of state preemption.
In general, state law preempts local law in two situations: when a
statute includes explicit language establishing a statewide scheme of
regulation, or by implication when the state and local powers materially
conflict.450 Additionally, courts may limit preemptive effect where state
law inadequately protects a right recognized in a state constitution.451
Apart from these general rules, there is no one-size-fits-all answer to
which state privacy laws preempt city privacy regulations. Rather, most
state privacy preemption issues begin (and end) with an analysis of the
interaction of specific state privacy laws and specific city privacy
regulations. For present purposes, this requires identifying and reviewing
laws in Washington and New York that regulate specific surveillance
technologies insofar as they may overlap with Seattle and New York
City’s local surveillance ordinances. At a minimum, this includes
Washington and New York state laws regulating video cameras and/or
facial recognition, ALPRs, and drones. Additionally, it is necessary to
identify and review Washington and New York’s laws that regulate
government records or personal data collected by government agencies
insofar as they overlap with Seattle and New York City’s locally-adopted
data governance rules.

449. See BRIFFAULT ET AL., supra note 444, at 5–8.
450. State courts decide when a conflict arises under state law and this is often a question of
legislative intent. See Diller, supra note 443, at 1155.
451. In theory, this would include the right of privacy, which ten states have recognized in express
constitutional provisions protecting personal privacy. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 112, at 126–27 (identifying the ten states as Alaska, Arizona, California,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington). The author has not
found any cases limiting preemptive effect based on a right to privacy as enumerated in a state
constitution.
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This task is large but manageable. The analysis begins with a
discussion of state regulation of a few specific surveillance
technologies452 and then turns to local government data laws.453
1.

Laws Regulating Specific Surveillance Technologies

a.

Video Surveillance and Facial Recognition

Video cameras observe and record activity in public spaces for many
purposes, including: crime prevention and detection, security and safety,
and counter-terrorism. They may be mounted on building facades, lamp
posts, utility poles, or inside businesses and public facilities in any area
that requires monitoring including airports, ATMs, banks, city streets,
convenience stores, hotels, public transportation, and schools.454 The first
generation of video surveillance cameras (also referred to as closed-circuit
television or CCTV) stored footage locally on analog videotapes. This
meant that investigators had to physically retrieve and manually play back
the tapes, which was cumbersome and inefficient. Today, advanced
surveillance cameras take full advantage of digital formats, cloud storage,
remote viewing, and controls. Most importantly, these new devices are
compatible with video content analysis, which detects movement and
even anomalous patterns of movement, and facial recognition

452. The state preemption analysis omits certain surveillance technologies which are available to
SPD and NYPD: StingRay tracking devices (devices that simulate a cell tower and detect cell phone
signals) and electronic toll collection systems (like Sound Transit’s ORCA pass or the Metropolitan
Transit Authority’s MetroCard). StingRays are omitted because federal policy applies across the
board, thereby avoiding localism issues. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
POLICY GUIDANCE: USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY 2–5 (2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download [https://perma.cc/CT5N-5WQE] (explaining that
Stingrays are regulated by a 2015 DOJ policy requiring federal, state, and local law enforcement to
obtain a search warrant before using the device); accord Jones v. United States, 168 A.3d 703, 709–
10 (D.C. 2017); Maryland v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 328 (Md. 2016). Washington State also requires
a warrant for the use of StingRays. See Cyrus Farivar, Cops Must Now Get a Warrant to Use Stingrays
in Washington State, ARS TECHNICA (May 12, 2015, 6:49 AM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2015/05/cops-must-now-get-a-warrant-to-use-stingrays-in-washington-state/
[https://perma.cc/K3V5-MNX6]. Electronic toll collection systems are omitted because the fare cards
in Seattle and New York City are not issued by the city but rather by regional transportation
authorities, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
453. The rules governing acquisition of data by government agencies from other government
agencies is beyond the scope of this Article. In future work, the author plans to analyze police
department data sharing with other city agencies, with regional, state, or federal agencies, and with
private sector firms.
454. See CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 101.
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applications, which automatically match a face in a digital image or a
video frame to a person in a facial database.455
In recent years, surveillance cameras have become more prevalent in
U.S. cities, thanks to lower costs and easier installation as well as the
availability of government grants for cities to install surveillance camera
networks.456 Although proponents of video cameras argue that they
enhance public safety by preventing or deterring crime and assisting in
criminal prosecutions, there have been few credible studies,457 and the
evidence supporting these claims is mixed at best,458 which only serves to
heighten privacy-related concerns.
One of these concerns is the risk of abuse. There are documented cases
of police officers using video data for criminal abuse (like blackmail),
institutional abuse (such as spying on or harassing political activists),
personal abuse (such as stalking women), discriminatory targeting (such
as targeting black or Latino youth who enter a majority-white
neighborhood), and voyeurism (such as male operators viewing or sharing
video feeds of scantily clad women or acts of intimacy).459 Additionally,
video surveillance may capture (and store for later analysis) ordinary
citizens exercising their First Amendment rights, thereby creating a
chilling effect on political and religious expression.460 Regardless of any
455. See generally LOREN SIEGEL, ROBERT A. PERRY & MARGARET HUNT GRAM, N.Y. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, WHO’S WATCHING?: VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE IN NEW YORK CITY AND
THE
NEED
FOR
PUBLIC
OVERSIGHT
(2006),
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/
default/files/publications/nyclu_pub_whos_watching.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
456. See Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-as-surveillance-grows-incities.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2018). New York City’s Domain Awareness System has about 9,000
video surveillance cameras linked together in a sophisticated network that also permits video content
analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 55–59.
457. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-748, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: INFORMATION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION TO MONITOR SELECTED FEDERAL
PROPERTY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 29 (2003) (“There is general consensus among CCTV users,
privacy advocates, researchers, and CCTV industry groups that there are few evaluations of the
effectiveness of CCTV in reducing crime . . . .”).
458. An exhaustive study of the effectiveness of San Francisco’s video surveillance program found
no evidence of an impact on violent crime and a decline in overall homicides in areas near the cameras
but an increase in areas far from the cameras and statistically significant and substantial declines in
property crime within view of the cameras. See JENNIFER KING ET AL., CITRIS REPORT: THE SAN
FRANCISCO
COMMUNITY
SAFETY
CAMERA
PROGRAM
(2008),
www.popcenter.org/library/scp/pdf/219-King.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JBR-V5ZG].
459. What’s
Wrong
with
Public
Video
Surveillance?,
ACLU
(2018),
https://www.aclu.org/other/whats-wrong-public-video-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/AQ6HX6UQ].
460. As Justice Sotomayor observed in a related context, “GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
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First Amendment concerns, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable
expectation of privacy test has little application to silent video
surveillance in public spaces.461
When law enforcement combines video surveillance systems with
facial recognition technology (FRT), these privacy concerns are greatly
increased. Although early experiments with the use of FRT in criminal
investigations or airport security were disappointing, the technology is
starting to improve and local police departments are renewing their
interest in adopting FRT.462 While still far from perfect, FRT is steadily
improving in quality as recent advances in 3D imaging and machine
learning have increased the reliability of the identification process.463
Moreover, facial databases are expanding and now include not only mug
shots but also driver’s licenses and other types of ID photos; a recent study
estimates that “law enforcement face recognition affects over 117 million
American adults.”464
Professor Laura Donohue argues that facial recognition represents the
first of a series of next generation biometrics that when paired with
surveillance of public space, transforms identification techniques in
several ways. According to Donohue, “immediate” biometric
identification is “focused (1) on a single individual; (2) close-up; (3) in
relation either to custodial detention or in the context of a specific physical
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations . . . . The Government can store
such records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future.” United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 416–17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
461. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 71, at 89–90. Several circuit courts have held that the Fourth
Amendment requires heightened specificity for video surveillance warrants but only in non-public
settings. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Falls, 34
F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).
462. Clare Garvie & Alvaro Bedoya, Smile! You’ve Just Been Identified by Face Recognition
Technology, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/smileidentified-face-recognition-article-1.3008512 [https://perma.cc/9HBU-7GRQ] (noting that the
NYPD has been using facial recognition technology in criminal investigations since 2011 and as of
last year has conducted “more than 8,500 facial recognition investigations, with over 3,000 possible
matches, and approximately 2,000 arrests” and plans to expand it use of this technology in the future
(citations omitted)).
463. Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote
Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 554 (2012).
464. CLARE GARVIE ET AL., GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH, THE PERPETUAL LINEUP:
UNREGULATED
POLICE
FACE
RECOGNITION
IN
AMERICA
(2016),
https://www.perpetuallineup.org/background [https://perma.cc/N5R4-9W6Q]; see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-267, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: FBI SHOULD BETTER
ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY 48 (2016) (stating that the FBI has access to more than 411 million
facial images, including driver’s license photos from sixteen states as well as visa application and
passport photos from the State Department).
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area related to government activity; (4) in a manner often involving notice
and often consent; and (5) in a one-time or limited occurrence.”465 In
contrast, “remote” biometric identification provides the government “the
ability to ascertain the identity (1) of multiple people; (2) at a distance;
(3) in public space; (4) absent notice and consent; and (5) in a continuous
and on-going manner.”466 The intrusiveness of these remote techniques
presents a unique challenge to liberty because they enable prolonged
surveillance that will also occur more frequently yet require significantly
fewer resources than existing systems.467
State Regulation of Video Surveillance—Most states do not regulate
video surveillance of public spaces. Washington State’s eavesdropping
law does not cover silent video recording,468 and its criminal procedure
laws are non-specific regarding video surveillance warrants, which may
fall within general warrant procedures requiring probable cause.469 New
York criminal procedure requires detailed warrants for individualized
video surveillance.470 These standards reflect heightened Fourth
Amendment protections for video surveillance established by the Second
Circuit because of the technology’s capacity to capture large volumes of
information.471 But such procedures are limited to situations where
warrantless surveillance would infringe on reasonable expectations of
privacy, which the courts do not recognize in public places, making New
York’s procedural requirements inapplicable to video surveillance of
streets and sidewalks.472 Professor Susan Freidwald argues that all video
surveillance implicates the same privacy concerns as wiretapping because
it is “hidden, intrusive, indiscriminate and continuous” and thus should be
subject to constitutional constraints.473 Despite these and other calls to

465. Donohue, supra note 463, at 415–16 (2012).
466. Id. at 415.
467. Id. at 529.
468. See Haymond v. Wash. Dep’t of Licensing, 73 Wash. App. 758, 761, 872 P.2d 61, 63 (Wash.
App. 1994) (holding that WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 “does not apply to the operation of a video
camera without an audible sound recording”).
469. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.79.035 (2018).
470. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.10–70 (McKinney 2018); 7-28 BENDER’S NEW YORK
EVIDENCE § 28.30(2) (2018).
471. See United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 507–09 (2d Cir. 1986).
472. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 20, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no
protection from video surveillance of apartment building entrance by DEA from public street). See
generally Olivia J. Greer, No Cause of Action: Video Surveillance in New York City, 18 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 589 (2012).
473. See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
3, 6 (2007).
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impose limits on surveillance of public spaces, courts have yet to respond.
But recognition of the “mosaic” capabilities of new technologies may well
prove a catalyst for future change.474
State Regulation of Facial Recognition—A few states have been
active in regulating commercial uses of biometrics, which under some
definitions includes face scans.475 In June 2017, Washington enacted a law
regulating businesses that collect and use biometric identifiers for
commercial purposes.476 However, this law applies solely to biometric
identifiers in commercial databases and excludes facial recognition data
from the definition of such identifiers.477 Although the Washington
Legislature enacted a second bill regulating state agency collection, use,
and retention of biometric identifiers (including facial recognition
data),478 this law applies to state, but not local, agencies479 and exempts all
“general authority Washington law enforcement agencies.” 480 Thus, it
does not apply to local police departments.
However, Seattle has stepped up to this regulatory task by developing
strict controls restricting the SPD’s use of facial recognition software to
comparisons of unidentified images and jail mug shots.481 SPD policy also
requires reasonable suspicion that the person in the image has committed
a crime and prohibits using the software to connect with live camera
systems.482 SPD developed this policy with input from ACLU-WA,
secured approval of the policy by an independent body (the Seattle City
Council), and published the policy online, all of which makes this policy
unique among U.S. cities that regulate facial recognition technology.483

474. See Levinson-Waldman, supra note 101, at 539–42.
475. For example, the 2008 Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, requires
that before collecting and storing any biometric identifier (defined as including face scans), the subject
of collection must receive notice in writing of the specific purpose of collection and the length of time
the identifier will be stored and must execute a written release before any biometric information is
captured. However, these restrictions only apply to a “private entity” and this term “does not include
a State or local government agency.” Id.
476. H.B. 1493, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
477. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2018).
478. H.B. 1717, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 40.26.020.
479. WASH. REV. CODE § 40.26.020(7)(a).
480. Id. § 40.26.020(8).
481. See Steven Miletich, Seattle Police Win Praise for Safeguards with Facial-Recognition
Software, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seattlepolice-wins-praise-for-safeguards-with-facial-recognition-software/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
482. Id.
483. Id. The SPD policy is published in the Seattle Police Department Manual. SEATTLE POLICE
DEPARTMENT MANUAL, supra note 130, § 12.045.
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New York also introduced a bill modeled on the Illinois law, but it did
not advance out of committee.484 The NYPD, which has been using facial
recognition technology since 2011, has been much less transparent than
Seattle regarding its policies and procedures.485
b.

Automatic License Plate Readers

ALPRs are computer-controlled, high-speed camera systems that
automatically capture an image of every license plate that comes into
view.486 Many police departments now use them mounted on patrol cars
or fixed objects (e.g., light poles, bridges, overpasses).487 There are also
applications that allow police officers to scan license plates with their
smartphones.488 When a license plate enters the camera’s field, ALPRs
capture an image of the car and its surroundings, and convert the image
of the license plate into machine-readable alphanumeric text, which may
be checked for matches against manually entered plate numbers and “hot
lists” of the plate numbers of stolen cars, AMBER alerts, felony arrest
warrants, registered sex offenders or people who are on supervised
release.489 ALPRs record and store data on each scanned licensed plate
(regardless of whether a match or “hit” is generated), including the plate
number and the date, time and place of recording.490 It is also possible to
aggregate ALPR data in centralized databases and trace a vehicle’s past
movements by plotting all of the license plate reads associated with a
vehicle’s owner or passenger. Additionally, ALPRs allow police to
identify each vehicle seeking to enter a specific geographical area and
construct a virtual fence around it.
As with any surveillance technology, the use of ALPRs by law
enforcement presents a risk of abuse if officers use data to stalk,
484. See S.B. 4887, 238th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015).
485. See Ava Kofman, NYPD Refuses to Disclose Information About Its Face Recognition
Program, so Privacy Researchers Are Suing, INTERCEPT (May 2, 2017, 5:36 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/05/02/nypd-refuses-to-disclose-information-about-its-facerecognition-program-so-privacy-researchers-are-suing/ [https://perma.cc/AZB7-DK9V].
486. ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING USED TO
RECORD AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclualprreport-opt-v05.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MHS-DAAG].
487. DHS and DOJ are key sources of funding for the acquisition of license plate readers by local
police departments. Id.
488. See Levine, supra note 55.
489. See Street-Level Surveillance: Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/automated-license-plate-readers [https://perma.cc/D5VTLY52].
490. Id.
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embarrass, or otherwise spy on innocent parties or engage in
discriminatory targeting. This is especially problematic if police
departments lack policies limiting access to license plate data or lack audit
or other mechanisms for ensuring accountability.491 Because ALPRs
capture and retain information about every vehicle that crosses their path,
rather than limiting such collection and retention to vehicles that generate
a hit, they enable law enforcement to gain significant insight into people’s
movements over a span of months or even years. As discussed below, this
would raise issues under both concurrences in Jones if the extended use
of ALPRs is of sufficient duration and pervasiveness to constitute “longterm monitoring.”492 On the other hand, the police certainly treat current
Fourth Amendment doctrine as permitting law enforcement use of ALPRs
in any single instance because “an observation made by a police officer
without a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment or require a search warrant.”493
State Regulation of ALPRs—Over a dozen states permit the use of
ALPRs by law enforcement but limit retention periods and sale to third
parties, while exempting ALPR data from disclosure under state public
record laws.494 Washington has not regulated ALPRs, although the SPD
has developed its own policy guidelines requiring certification and
training of operators in the proper use of this technology, limiting the use
of ALPRs to routine patrol and criminal investigations, and restricting
access to ALPR data.495 Seattle’s surveillance ordinance does not apply to
ALPRs because, as previously noted, it specifically excludes both
cameras installed in or on police vehicles and certain stationary cameras.
In contrast, the New York State Senate is considering a bill prohibiting
businesses and individuals from using ALPRs and limiting allowable uses

491. See generally Jennifer Lynch, Automated License Plate Readers Threaten Our Privacy, ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(2013),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/alpr?from=sls
[https://perma.cc/54VT-PCY3].
492. See supra text accompanying notes 98–100; KEITH GIERLACK ET AL., RAND CORP., LICENSE
PLATE READERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 37–38 (2014),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/247283.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VXX-JEFY].
493. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., STATE OF N.Y., SUGGESTED GUIDELINES: OPERATION OF
LICENSE
PLATE
READER
TECHNOLOGY
10
(2011),
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/motor-vehicle/LPR-Operation-SuggestedGuidelines-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QUV-EE73].
494. See Automated License Plate Readers: State Statutes Regulating Their Use, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/state-statutes-regulating-the-use-of-automated-license-plate-readers-alpr-or-alprdata.aspx [https://perma.cc/7JR6-UJKN].
495. SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL, supra note 130, § 16.170.
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by law enforcement agencies.496 Additionally, the bill would limit the
retention of captured plate data to no more than 180 days with certain
exceptions. Finally, the bill would require law enforcement agencies to
destroy evidence gathered with ALPRs unless they “apply for a court
order for disclosure of captured plate data” while offering “specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the captured plate data is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal or
missing persons investigation.”497 Both the Senate bill and (weaker)
Assembly bill remain in committee.
c.

Drones

“Unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs), commonly known as drones,
raise surveillance issues because they are often equipped with digital
recorders, microphones, and other sensors. UAVs range from small
“quadcopters” that can hover near ground level to high-altitude planes
with extremely powerful cameras. Many cities in the United States have
acquired the smaller UAVs for non-controversial purposes such as
handling bomb threats, search and rescue missions, and crime-scene
photography.498 But UAVs also facilitate ubiquitous government
surveillance, combining cost-effectiveness with high levels of technical
capability.499 Commentators suggest that U.S. law enforcement is
expanding its use of drones for surveillance purposes,500 while drone use
by hobbyists and commercial firms raises separate but related privacy
concerns ranging from voyeurism to corporate espionage. As Professor
Ryan Calo reminds us, “George Orwell specifically describes small flying
devices that roam neighborhoods and peer into windows.”501 Orwell’s

496. S.B. S23, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). The amended version of a companion bill
in the N.Y. State Assembly all but eliminates the requirements on law enforcement. See Shane Trejo,
Fail: New York Assembly Committee Guts Bill to Limit Automatic License Plate Readers, TENTH
AMENDMENT CTR. (June 1, 2016), http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2016/06/fail-new-yorkassembly-committee-guts-bill-to-limit-automatic-license-plate-readers/
[https://perma.cc/U4ZAA592].
497. Additionally, New York has set out suggested guidelines for the operation of ALPR
technology in the form of best practices that sought to “provide authorized users with the information
necessary to ensure public safety while protecting individual privacy rights.” See DIV. OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVS., supra note 493.
498. See Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 54–55 (2015).
499. See id. at 56–59.
500. See
Domestic
Drones,
ACLU
(2016),
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/domestic-drones [https://perma.cc/T8KC-VH83].
501. See M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 32 (2011).

14 - Rubinstein (3).docx (Do Not Delete)

2018]

1/6/2019 12:43 PM

PRIVACY LOCALISM

2045

1984 is the starting point for imagining the level of intrusion society may
expect from silent, low-cost, low-profile, highly maneuverable devices,
outfitted with digital cameras and microphones, and wireless connections
to the cloud. But the end point may look more like the constant
surveillance of Blade Runner 2049.502
State Regulation of Drones—Almost two-dozen states regulate drone
privacy, requiring law enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant prior to
their use for surveillance.503 In Washington, the legislature passed a bill
that would have placed limits on the use of drones for law enforcement
purposes.504 But the governor vetoed the bill citing concerns about
conflicting provisions on public disclosure and the definition of public
information, while simultaneously announcing the creation of a task force
to study surveillance technology and postponing any purchasing of UAVs
pending completion of the study.505 In 2016, Washington’s Chief Privacy
Officer issued drone guidelines encouraging law enforcement officials to
use drones only in connection with properly authorized investigations and
activities, respect existing state and federal laws and regulations regarding
the privacy of personal information, and respect civil rights.506
In New York, the legislature has introduced three bills to regulate the
use of drones by law enforcement. The strictest bill bans drone
surveillance in “locations where a person would have an expectation of
privacy,” with exceptions for the use of drones in “exigent circumstances”
502. BLADE RUNNER 2049 (Warner Bros. 2017).
503. See Allie Bohm, Drone Legislation: What’s Being Proposed in the States?, ACLU (Mar. 6
2013,
3:15
PM),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/dronelegislation-whats-being-proposed-states [https://perma.cc/4L7H-5DX7]. At the federal level, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates UAVs with respect to commercial use, safety, and
licensing, but not privacy. See Stephanie Condon, FAA Sued for Lack of Drone Privacy Rules, ZDNET
(Aug. 24, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/faa-sued-for-lack-of-drone-privacy-rules/
[https://perma.cc/4PFQ-WE5D]. Congress has considered a number of drone privacy bills, including
several versions of the Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act, a bill that would “require law
enforcement agencies . . . to describe how they plan to minimize the collection and retention of data
that’s unrelated to a crime investigation” and “to obtain a warrant before conducting surveillance”
subject to certain exceptions. See Jennifer Martinez, Markey Introduces Drone Privacy Bill, HILL
(Dec. 18, 2012, 7:54 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/273519-markey-introduces-droneprivacy-bill [https://perma.cc/7QSZ-4MTA].
504. See H.B. 2789, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014). A bill that is similar to H.B. 2789 is now
pending in the state legislature. See H.B. 1102, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
505. See Leilani Leach, Washington Gov. Jay Inslee Vetoes Drone Bill, GOV’T TECH. (Apr. 18,
2014),
http://www.govtech.com/state/Washington-Gov-Jay-Inslee-Vetoes-Drone-Bill.html
[https://perma.cc/T7FN-SSB2].
506. OFFICE OF PRIVACY & DATA PROT., STATE OF WASH., WASHINGTON STATE POLICY
GUIDELINES
FOR
UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS
(2016),
http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/AC738BE5-FDCE-4FD9-A173-6C913FDABE24/0/
DronePolicyGuidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFS7-KTMQ].
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or pursuant to a search warrant in investigations of serious crimes.507 A
second bill imposes similar restrictions on law enforcement use but
contains additional privacy restrictions applicable to all state agencies.508
A third bill bans warrantless use of UAVs (with a few exceptions) and
voids the use of such evidence in criminal proceedings.509 All three bills
were introduced in earlier sessions but did not advance.
2.

Laws Regulating the Privacy of Government Records

Few states regulate the data governance practices of state agencies in a
manner comparable to the Privacy Act or have anything resembling the
Privacy Act’s requirement for publishing SORNs or PIAs.510 This broad
generalization requires further clarification. All fifty states have public
record or freedom of information laws requiring government agencies to
disclose certain information to people upon request.511 Most of these are
patterned after FOIA. These state counterparts typically apply to both
state and local agencies; this is certainly true in both Washington and New
York.512 These laws generally include some form of privacy exemption,
which may be similar (or more restrictive) than the two privacy
exemptions in FOIA.513
The Washington Public Records Act (PRA) is unusual in that it
combines a very broad public disclosure requirement514 with a very
narrowly construed privacy exemption that parallels the elements of the
tort of public disclosure of private facts.515 Thus, an agency exempting
information from a record must do so based upon an independent statute
that creates a right to privacy and that outweighs the PRA’s broad policy

507. S.B. 1174, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
508. A.B. A3396, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
509. S.B. 2913, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
510. See supra notes 114 and 115.
511. For a list of all fifty laws, see SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS, supra
note 112, at 119–21.
512. See, e.g., Washington Public Records Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2018); N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW § 86(3) (McKinney 2017).
513. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6)–(b)(7)(C) (2012).
514. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (stating that the public disclosure requirements “shall
be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed” to promote the policy of an informed
public); see also Sargent v. Seattle Police Dep’t, 179 Wash. 2d 376, 385, 314 P.3d 1093, 1097 (2013)
(discussing how the PRA mandates “broad public disclosure”).
515. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.050 (limiting exemptions to disclosures of personal
information that are highly offensive to a reasonable person and not of legitimate concern to the
public).
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in favor of disclosing records.516 In Does v. King County,517 the
Washington Court of Appeals found that individuals did not have a right
to privacy when they were captured on surveillance video of a public area.
New York’s FOIL also provides citizens with access to records related
to government operations subject to various exemptions. This includes a
standard privacy exemption for information that “if disclosed would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”518 The statute
offers several examples of unwarranted invasions519 and in cases beyond
these explicit terms courts “must decide whether any invasion of
privacy . . . is ‘unwarranted’ by balancing the privacy interests at stake
against the public interest in disclosure of the information.”520 New York
law also includes a provision that broadly exempts police and other
uniformed officers from the reach of the FOIL,521 which arguably blocks
the public disclosure of footage from body-worn cameras.522
Finally, Washington and New York both have several narrower state
privacy laws that may affect how cities treat specific records including
school records,523 medical records concerning HIV/AIDS status,524 and
library records.525
In sum, the threat of state preemption of local privacy regulation turns
out to be less severe than anticipated. Most states (including Washington
and New York) either do not regulate law enforcement’s use of the
surveillance technologies highlighted above or impose requirements that
would not conflict with local surveillance laws. Only ten states (including
New York but not Washington) regulate the data governance practices of
state agencies but none of these laws apply to local governments. It
follows that both Seattle and New York City have a relatively free hand
in regulating surveillance technologies and devising local data governance
policies and practices. Most importantly, even if New York enacted
pending ALPR or drone bills, these laws would likely set state floors on

516. For example, personal information in agency employee files is exempt if disclosure would
violate the employee’s right to “privacy.” See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.230(3).
517. 192 Wash. App. 10, 366 P.3d 936 (2015).
518. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(b) (McKinney 2017).
519. Id. § 89(b)(2)(b).
520. In re New York Times Co. v. N.Y.C. Fire Dep’t, 829 N.E.2d 266, 269–70 (N.Y. Ct. App.
2005).
521. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-a (2018).
522. See Cynthia Conti-Cook, Open Data Policing, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 3 (2017).
523. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.605.030 (2018); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3222.
524. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.02.220; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782.
525. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.310; N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 4509.
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local activity without preventing the city from strengthening these privacy
protections or devising more comprehensive regulatory schemes
governing all surveillance technology and all local government data.
Finally, suppose that Washington or New York were to enact laws
directly covering surveillance technologies or local data governance?
Wouldn’t such laws preempt the local privacy regulations under
consideration in Part II and render them superfluous? In fact, one need not
look further than California to determine what a state law on surveillance
technology might look like and how it would affect local surveillance
ordinances in Santa Clara County, Oakland, Berkeley, and Palo Alto.
Senate Bill 21 (S.B. 21) requires transparency and accountability in
decisions about the use of surveillance technology. 526 It is highly
consistent with local surveillance ordinances already in effect in
California’s cities and preserves their underlying structure by requiring all
local law enforcement agencies to develop use polices for surveillance
technologies and seek executive approval at the local or regional level
before deployment. Indeed, as one legislator stated, S.B. 21 “is inspired
in part by a Santa Clara County ordinance . . . passed in 2016.” 527 Once
again, the California legislature serves as a laboratory for policy
experimentation, in this case by responding to innovative city regulations
by emulating them, not supplanting them, and enacting a state law
mandating local or regional approval. Of course, one can also imagine
state legislatures doing the opposite by passing laws to prevent cities from
enacting surveillance ordinances, arguing that they stymie law
enforcement efforts. But so far this has not been the case in the seventeen
states that have passed or considered local surveillance ordinances.528
CONCLUSION
Seattle and New York City have begun to experiment with local
privacy regulation in a thoughtful and innovative fashion, cognizant both
of gaps in federal and state privacy law and the importance of working
within their limited power and immunity as local governments. It is too
soon to determine the extent to which these surveillance ordinances and
city privacy principles will achieve their stated goals, or whether they will
require further refinement in response to emerging issues. Nevertheless,
it is already clear that both cities have embraced a novel approach to
regulating local surveillance that transcends the limitations of modern
526. S.B. 21, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
527. Hearing on S.B. 21 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Privacy and Consumer Protection, 2017–
2018 Leg. (July 10, 2017) (written summary by Ed Chau, Comm. Chair).
528. For a map of these states, see supra note 20.
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Fourth Amendment doctrine, related federal statutes, and piecemeal state
legislation. Both cities have taken important steps toward appropriately
balancing the potential benefits of smart city and open data programs and
the public demand for transparency, privacy, and trust in elected officials.
While obstacles remain, these cities are less susceptible to federal or state
override because they are acting well within their “police powers” and
enacting laws that either do not conflict with federal or state statutes or
exceed the floor these statutes establish.
Other cities, too, are embracing privacy localism as described in this
Article. Assuming the Seattle and New York City experiments achieve
their promise of more democratic policing and smarter but more
trustworthy municipal services, these trends may expand to additional
locales as well. At the very least, the potential success of privacy localism
may inspire federal and state regulators to develop more robust privacy
frameworks that benefit everyone regardless of locale. Thus, privacy
localism has the potential to shape emerging privacy norms in a world that
is increasingly urban and increasingly focused on harnessing big data to
serve the public good.

